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THE CONCEPT OF DURATION 
AS KEY TO THE LOGICAL FORMS OF REASON 
AND 
THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES 
BY CHRISTIAN 0. WEBER 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
TIME AND THE ANTITHESIS BETWEEN THOUGHT 
AND REALITY 
1 
1. The Greeks, not sparing even thought itself from their 
insatiable questionings, posed the problem, " How can we 
seek for knowledge which we do not already possess? " 
Human thinking, whose alleged function is to illuminate all 
other problems, is itself the most baffling enigma. For, if 
we stop to examine this commonplace experience of thinking, 
it enmeshes us in logical tangles so abstruse that they beggar 
both science and philosophy. No wonder, then, that modern 
psychology, so eminently successful in measuring intelligence, 
is yet unable to decide what intelligence is. This but verifies 
a familiar observation made by Poincare to the effect . that 
the familiar things in life are the most surprising and mys-
terious. Then let the logicians be unashamed of the inscrut-
able syllogism, which seems to shed light on all things by 
means of the dubious device of keeping all the darkness within 
itself. But this inner canker of darkness becomes apparent 
when we cease to think about things and think about thought; 
and as James inferred, it is the cause which keeps the never-
stopping clock of metaphysics going. 
4 The Concept of Duration 
The human mind, because the human heart is Platonic, 
will not cease striving for its unattainable ideal. We 
seek knowledge whose clarity is perfect; but before we can 
make assured progress in this direction, we must first of all 
put an end to thinking about thought. Epistemology is the 
inevitable cul de sac of our hope of attaining perfect knowl-
edge. Poincare somewhere observes that science, far from 
overcoming the complexities of nature, only transfers them 
to the textbooks. This is but the parallel in science of a 
similar tour de force in philosophy: We move from victory 
to victory in the realm of thought about things only at the 
cost of multiplying defects in the sphere of thought about 
thought. It would be unnecessary to repeat here the number-
less self-contradictions which beset formal logic and higher 
mathematics at their best. Kant and Hegel, Bergson and 
Schiller have made their familiarity banal in its intensity. 
The reality of these self-defects in the theory of knowledge, 
however, overshadows any other vice they exhibit, if indeed, 
they are vices at all. That the human mind is almost invari-
ably led to believe that antitheses in knowledge must be vices, 
is attested by the fact that the attempt to remedy such anti-
theses has brought about the main schools of thought of the 
present, whether pragmatic, idealistic, or realistic. In 
science, the advent of relativism essentially means the advent 
of logical devices to remedy the logical deadlocks of the 
Newtonian system. 
2. It is the central aim of this thesis to examine the intri-
cate factors which condition this inevitable cloud-gathering 
called ' epistemology.' We may distinguish two fundamental 
accounts which the human mind is inclined to give regarding 
the discrepancy between the perfect theory of knowledge for 
which we seek, and the circular results which we always 
achieve. (1) There is first the view that the obdurate self-
contradictions of our ways of knowing are inevitable and 
unavoidable. This is the case, for instance, in Bergson's 
belief in an ever-growing reality which must always burst 
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the measures to which we would confine it. This view, in its 
radical form, is always dualistic or pluralistic. It regards 
the chasm between thought and reality, between the meas-
ured and the measuring, as evidence of a primal and incurable 
rift in the nature of existence itself. Our universe, it holds, 
is a dual and unstable one, sharing our struggle for existence. 
There exists in the essence of things, the irrational, the 
chaotic. Reality is woven of two irreducible opposites, which 
we meet in our experience as the opposition of truth to error, 
good to evil, and beauty to ugliness. We can find no common 
denominator to which these forces may be reduced, simply 
because none exists. In the last analysis, evil, ugliness, and 
error are not to be understood but to be fought; we seek to 
understand them only that we may strike. Yet, despite this 
dualism of theory, it leads to a curious monism of practice: 
Our warfare against this triune of foes will be effective to 
the degree that we do understand them; and when our enmity 
against them is at its best, we live as if they could be fully 
understood! Thus, in science, we act as if nature were con-
served; while with Alchemists' hearts we yearn to violate 
her 'givenness.' Nevertheiless, this 'intentional' positing 
of an absolute order is here at least made a pre-condition of 
thinking, not thought's goal. There is indeed a far cry be-
tween accepting the 'uniformity' and rationality of nature 
as the guide to thought, and in accepting them in advance as 
thought's assured goal. 
The second solution is by far the favorite one. It assumes 
that nature embodies an ' absolute order ' of things, whether 
in terms of the ' uniformity of phenomena ' posited by science, 
or in terms of the ' rational ground ' posited by the Hegelian 
idealists. According to this view, nature is such that our 
knowledge ought in time to exhaust it. According to this 
account there are two ways of interpreting our present (and 
historicaily, omnipresent) difficulty of a logic which fails to 
lock-step with reality. We may insist that the true logic 
must be uni-modal, having but one set of postulates, and a 
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unitary technique. At present, this outlook is abandoned in 
favor of another device: the attempt to encompass reality, 
not by perfecting one instrument, but rather by multiplying 
instruments. This is an age, not of logic, but of logics. In 
imitation of current mathematics, with its plurality of geom-
etries, we tend to accept a plurality of logics. Witness 
Russell's distinction of 'transitive' from 'intransitive' judg-
ments,· and the erection of special logics to deal with the 
latter form. Today, truth, whether in geometry or logic, can 
only mean the consistent use of one set of postulates. 
Curiously, the ability to choose the right logic for the right 
problem, or a geometry of just the right number of dimen-
sions, becomes a matter of brute' cunning' in Samuel Butler's 
sense. But, this sort of thought, which really solves a prob-
lem, is left outside of both logic and geometry. The right 
geometry once selected, thought dies - the routine processes 
of geometry represent thought in the act of becoming habit. 
To be sure, these 'habits' are acquired at the expense of 
thought, but in regard to the questions: " how do new geom-
etries evolve," the manuals of geometry are notoriously silent. 
We must never, in any case, confuse this latter view with 
the dualistic or pluralistic one first mentioned. This age of 
many geometries and many logics is hardly even pluralistic 
in its epistemology, and perhaps never is in its ontology. 
That is, though we have in addition to the geometry of Euclid, 
the geometries of Riemann and Lobachevski, all three of them 
have physical situations corresponding to them. However 
Einstein emphasizes the relativity of physical states, he still 
accepts the state of light as an absolute, which binds all rela-
tive states into a unitary system. Symbolic logic does not 
' oust ' traditional logic but accepts it as one out of a coor-
dinate set of logics. These ' epistemological ' pluralists differ 
fundamentally from the ontological pluralists. Though the 
ontological pluralist may also multiply methods even more 
radically, by adding intuition to reason, metaphor to formula, 
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they do so only to approximate reality, not to come to literal 
grips with it. 
3. The history of logic, seen in perspective, appears as a 
struggle between the opposed convinctions mentioned above. 
Perhaps the opposition is one of temperament rather than of 
reason. Our choice of one or the other may be fundamentally 
a moral choice. For instance, the demand for an absolutely 
'given' knowledge practically results in our digging for 
'more' knowledge than we have. Perhaps the Bergsonian 
despair that nature is inexhaustible means practically that we 
must be content with what knowledge we have already. Only, 
Bergson can retort that the notion of an absolute knowledge 
leads us to the illusion that we have it already. 
A dear ideal of knowledge awoke in the breasts of the 
ancient Greeks, and the struggle to attain this ideal forms 
the central theme which unites the history of science and the 
history of philosophy into one drama. Our ideal knowledge 
must have two traits: (1) it must be 'exact' and (2) it 
must be exhaustively true to reality. Knowledge becomes 
exact as it approaches the mathematical ideal. All sciences, 
born of philosophy, slowly and steadily approach the mathe-
matical norm. Astronomy and physics are thought to have 
made the nearest ' approach ' to it. But, never has Zeno's 
paradox of Achilles and the tortoise found so grim a verifica-
tion. In truth, we are in a more hapless plight than was 
Achilles. Achilles, so some accounts have it, meets defeat at 
the hands of infinity- the infinite subdivisibility of the path 
over which he runs. Now, the human mind in its struggle 
for the exhaustively true and completely exact, has two in-
finites to conquer: for both truth and exactness, though 
posited as fixed goals, turn out to be ideals, ever receding 
from our approach. We have not actually achieved such 
knowledge; but this difficulty, great enough in view of the 
tremendous price we pay for every advance of knowledge, is 
a trifle in comparison with a greater difficulty, namely; that 
we cannot even think such an attainment. The attempt to 
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conceive of absolute knowledge brings on logical deadlock, 
which takes the form of the following dilemma: Mathe-
matical formulae and logical inferences become exact just to 
the extent that they become alienated from reality. Hence 
Russell's humorous slander of mathematics as the one science 
in which we never know what we are talking about! To 
encompass reality, our knowledge must surrender its pre-
tense to exactness. The history of thought exhibits the 
human mind grasping first one, then the other horn of this 
dilemma. 
The ancient Greeks contrasted sense knowledge with 
rational knowledge; and accepted rational knowledge as em-
bodying the loved ideals, exactness, and truth. The Sophists 
achieve the first revolt, insisting that sense knowledge is in 
touch with the realities and that it gives us no absolute. 
Socrates and Aristotle restore the repute of rational ideals; 
and Medievalism perpetuates it. But with the Schoolmen, 
the exactness of syllogistic knowledge is portrayed with such 
vigor that this very exactness itself begins to look like an 
inexaustible source of novel exactness! The Schoolmen also 
exhibited the forlorn isolation of rational knowledge from 
reality. Then, with the advent of empirical science during 
the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, the pendulum of 
opinion swings to the other extreme. Sense knowledge, in the 
guise of scientific induction, again wins because of its in-
herent capacity to grapple with the 'realities' of the external 
world; but only to lose again because of its inherent inability 
to give absolute knowledge. 
With Kant we get a new formulation of the problem which 
has had scant parallel in preceding times. Kant, so to speak, 
accepts this pendular nature of thought as natural. To him, 
knowledge has two forms; there is ' pure reason ' opposed to 
'practical reason.' Pure reason is always relative, and can-
not attain the absolute because it cannot surmount the anti-
nomies. Practical reason alone can attain the absolute. 
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With Hegel, a renewed endeavor to achieve the rational 
ideal presents itself, whose essential features are so unique 
that history is even more empty of parallel than in the case 
of Kant. Hegel, noting the inherent self-contradictoriness of 
knowledge, attempts to solve the difficulty by the unique de-
vice of treating this self-contradictoriness as logically neces-
sary. The alternative, that contradiction may originate, not 
in knowing but in the nature of the world known, is excluded 
by that other device of idealism, to regard nature too as an 
idea. The universe, according to Hegel's treatment, becomes 
a universe of thought, evolving according to the logical neces-
sities of ' thesis ' and ' antithesis.' 
To the writer, at least, the undying greatness and signif-
icance of Hegel lies in his full grasp of the predicament o~ 
epistemology. He saw, not only that the disease of self-con-
tradictoriness is· the one invariable factor which brings about 
the defeat of epistemologists; but (and this is his great re-
semblance to Kant), he accepts this contradictoriness as in-
curable. He is unique only in his device of treating the anti-
theses of thought as logically necessary steps of one process. 
He is the great Stoic of epistemology, making a virtue out of 
a difficulty. If only we could banish the suspicion that Hegel 
sought to banish difficulties by treating them as the chief 
symptom of clarity. 
The predecessors of Hegel found an insoluble opposition 
between the objectivity of induction and the exactness of de-
duction. Deductive reasoning is exact enough, but we are 
not sure that it is true to the realities, i.e., that it is objective. 
Hegel objectifies thought, but forthwith sacrifices its exact-
ness. For, if thought is by nature antithetical, thought is by 
nature unable to find absolute knowledge, i.e., it can never 
put an end to its own processes, since every synthesis but 
anticipates a new antithesis. Hegel's successors, Fichte and 
Schelling, exhibit the eternal opposition of Hegel's 'thesis' 
and ' antithesis ' in terms of the oppositions of the ' self ' to 
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the 'not-self.' Precisely as in science, we have accumulating 
instances, but no absolute rule about the number of instances 
it takes to validate a generalization. If there is no absolute 
end to the succession of theses and antitheses, Hegel believes 
that we can at least assert that thought is absolutely anti-
thetfoal: our one absolute truth regards thought itself, not 
things thought about. But we dispute the claim that thought 
is inherently antithetical. We cannot assume that because 
thought has always turned out to be antithetical in the past, 
that this must always be the case. It is again the reality of 
time, the possibility of finding a final ' synthesis' that stands 
in the way of Hegel's unique attempt to achieve a present 
absolute knowledge, namely, that thought is eternally anti-
thetical. 
In brief, Hegel apparently discerned that it is the timeful-
ness of reality which renders it opaque to thought; and accord-
ingly seeks to conquer that timefulness by embodying it in 
the nature of thought. Time has indeed been the great point 
de resistance in nature. Only the devastations and changes 
wrought by the destroyer time have blocked our attempt to 
erect a system of order where thought and things have a one-
to-one relation. To others, Hegel's method will appear like 
that of a wise general, who sees clearly that one and only 
one achievement can assure the conquest of absolute knowl-
edge. Thought can only hope to absorb nature by conquering 
its strongest citadel, the reality of time. 
4. The significance of time to the problem of knowledge, 
whether in science or philosophy, is at present in the fore-
front of speculation. After the advent of instrumentalism 
in science, and the explicit attack on the concept of time in 
physical relativism; after Bergson's vindication of time, and 
the pervasive attention which this concept gets in the writings 
of both realists and idealists of the present, we can have no 
<loubt but that the logical oppositions between schools of 
thought can be almost completely stated in terms of their 
respective orientations to the problem of time. Plato ob-
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served 1 that time is unworthy of the solicitude of immortal 
beings; because in the realm of perfection, the transitory is 
a matter of indifference. Only, we are beginning to suspect 
that we are not immortal beings; and that, in the language 
fo Anaximander, 2 we too must atone for our "offense against 
the order of time." 
5. It is the aim of this thesis to develop the view that 
there is a mode of thinking which implicitly embodies time 
within it, namely, the imagination. Imagination is the inter-
mediary between formal reasoning and the reality it seeks to 
portray; that imagination at once partakes of the nature of 
thought and deed. I show that in imagination, rightly con-
ceived, we have a generic mode of thought, suitable to all 
problems, artistic, moral, intellectual. But, because imagina-
tion has a multiplicity of problems, it has a multiplicity of 
ways of dealing with them. And, because these problems 
are opposed, the devices employed to solve them will be 
opposed also. So that, if we isolate the routine processes of 
thought, and erect them into logics, each with its own post-
ulates, we have on our hands a double predicament. First, 
these logics will be mutually contradictory. Hence Aristotle's 
opposition of the active versus the passive reason, St. 
Anselm's opposition of faith to reason, Kant's opposition of 
pure to practical reason, Bergson's opposition of intellect to 
intuition. Second, will be the discrepancy between reality 
and each special system which we set up. But, if we view 
our special logics in terms of their generic origin out of 
imagination, will their opposition cease? 
This is but to ask again, whether the dualist's view that 
reality bears within itself a clashing of forces which goes to 
its very depth is right or wrong. If it is right, then oppo-
sitions must always appear in thought so long as it is ' about ' 
the whole of reality. And the author, with due regard to 
1 Herbert Nichols, The Psychology of Time, N. Y., 1891, p. 1. 
2 Zeller, Pre,-Socratic Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 256. 
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the declaration made by William James that in matters so 
obscure, we are all beggars, accepts the dualist's view. We 
can cover this our essential beggardom by an exhibition of 
plentiful and fairly clear details regarding more superficial 
matters. These, the author hopes, the reader will find in the 
essentially psychological and scientific (and perhaps also 
logical) analyses of the thought processes to be found in the 
following chapters. The epistemological issues mentioned in 
this introduction are but feeble threads holding together 
chapters of a much more empirical kind. 
II 
MEASURED AND MEASURING TIME 
1 
MATHEMATICAL TIME VERSUS DURATION 
6. If the system of formal logic furnishes its own epistem-
ology, then its concepts must be taken just as they represent 
themselves; that is, as wholly timeless. But this is just the 
dilemma which the theory of knowledge must overcome; 
namely, the difficulty of how concepts bereft of time can be 
knowledge of a timeful object, or knowledge to a subject who 
never escapes time's omnipresence. This problem may be 
approached from the standpoint of psychology: for the con-
cept is a product of thought, and examination may show that 
the static property of concepts may be only 'intentional' in 
Brentano's sense; or that knowledge, as the Critical Realists 
say, is only 'affirmed,' or is 'transitive' in nature. A pos-
sible way out of the difficulty of timeless knowledge which 
still represents a timeful reality is indicated by the argument 
that chronological time is itself a concept, which ' stands for • 
timelessness, but which is itself the product of a maturation 
or development in time. 
If man is indeed the measure of all things we should expect 
that back of the inert symbolism of numbers there is a wealth 
of growing meaning which really exhibits creative activity at 
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high rather than at low tide. On the other hand, numbers 
represent the universe as all lifeless and dissected; yet the 
mathematical mode of thought seems to exhibit creative 
thinking at its best. There is a mode of thinking, the im-
agination, which like experience itself, is in the nature of a 
<lream, with vital history in all its phases. But with the so-
called 'higher' modes of thought, as exhibited in the special 
procedures of logic, mathematics, and in moral reflection, 
this timefulness seems to vanish. But we believe that con-
sideration of certain psychological data will show that this 
timefulness has not vanished, but is only disguised. Is it 
possible to discover in the symbols of mathematics and logic 
the clear evidence of a maturation or development in time of 
which concepts are the fruit? Before answering this ques-
tion, it is necessary to specify the exact sense of the word 
time which we consider an indispensable principle in the 
interpretation of the facts of the reasoning process. 
7. Let us distinguish at the outset a mathematical and a 
psychological concept of time. Mathematical time is dis-
tinguished by its mathematical properties, but in opposition 
to it we may describe a concept of time for which there is no 
very satisfactory current designation. It is variously termed 
'subjective' time, the 'measured' time, 'psychological' 
time, or 'duration.' The last term is perhaps the most suit-
able because Bergson has given to it the connotation we wish 
to emphasize. The full meaning of this theory of time will 
appear when it is contrasted with its opposite, which is the 
mathematical conception of time. After stating these 
theories in their fullest opposition, we will seek to determine 
the bearing of experimental facts upon them. Thirdly, we 
ought to determine by logical analysis the categories proper 
to each of them. Last of all we ought to indicate certain 
properties of time that have escaped both experimentation 
and logical analysis. For the innermost savor of the experi-
ence of time utterly escapes both instrumental and logical 
an.'.!.lysis. Its most vital reality escapes all technique save the 
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technique of our deeds. It is not improbable that the notion 
of a numbering time derives its intelligibility from the fact 
that numbers themselves are psychogenetic rather than 
transcendental in their meaning. H. B. Alexander has shown 
the futility of the attempt to impart meaning to numbers 
without going beyond them.1 Such attempts, according to his 
argument, result either in a purely nominalistic mathematic 
or a mathematic whose realism is that of a world transcending 
ours. In either case number remains in as much need of 
explanation as before. It is the invention of counting, he 
maintains, and the " psychology of number consciousness " 2 
that give meaning to numbers. "As for mathematics," he 
adds, " its arithmetic is au fond the digits of our limbs, its 
geometry their motions." 3 
But deeds, one may object, are not as such philosophical -
they do not constitute knowledge, until they are given an in-
telligible voice. We shall see whether the dynamism of deeds 
is not the key to the psychological meaning of number. Be-
sides, deeds have moral and aesthetic aspects in which we 
may find the continuity and the discontinuity of the clock's 
time reconciled. It is first necessary that we examine closely 
the two opposing conceptions of time which we have men-
tioned, in order to be assured that we have not created a 
fictitious problem for ourselves. 
2 
THE PROPERTIES OF MATHEMATICAL TIME AND 
THE PROPERTIES OF DURATION 
8. Scientists and laymen alike entertain a certain duality 
of motive which leads them to employ, in their daily affairs, 
at least, both the mathematical and the durational concept of 
1 H. B. Alexander, "The Definition of Number," The Monist, Vol. 
XXV, 1915. Also in Nature and Human Nature, Chicago, 1923, Chap. 
IX. 
2 Op. Cit., p. 352. 
3 Op. Cit., p. 356. 
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time. The simple experience of drinking a cup of tea will 
exhibit this fact. If eager for the drink, the time taken by 
the lump of sugar to dissolve ' seems long ' to us, while the 
succeeding period of satiation seems short. Meanwhile, 
however, the placid clock may have doled but an equal time 
for each moment of the act. Yet, spite of the fact that the 
dial contradicts experience, to think of time as a rate of 
motion over a dial is a deep-seated habit of every man who 
is synchronized to the routines of civilization; and because 
of this habit we speak of the time of the clock as ' real ' and 
our inner experience of time as only ' seeming.' We treat 
time as a quantity all for the commercial and social advan-
tages of doling it out in unit quantities,. as for the buying 
and selling of labor, or for the sake of any other of our 
Eocial cooperations. Nevertheless, if we give heed we shall 
see that the 'seeming' delay or haste of our subjective ex-
perience is probably just as important a factor in our lives 
as is the clock's mechanical rate. We do not note the paradox 
of the contradiction in our twofold view until we boldly 
attempt to treat all time as exclusively the time of the clock. 
We somehow are not pursuaded when told that a period of 
insufferable waiting ' lasted but a moment ' according to the 
time of the clock. To be sure, if we depended on our inner 
sense of time alone ·our cooperative life would be thrown in 
hopeless turmoil. From the point of view of chronometry 
our inner sense of time is arbitrary and lawless. 
There are prevailing, therefore, two views of time. There 
is a ' measured ' time and a ' measuring ' time. In daily 
experience, when we are free from the sophistication of 
metaphysics, a n~ysterious synthesis seems to come about be-
tween them. Metaphysically, the practical harmony between 
chronometrical time and time as duration, becomes a paradox. 
There is danger of making this paradox an insoluable one. 
We are subject to the inveterate intellectual habit which 
tempts us to solve this problem by treating either mathe-
matical time or time as duration as alone ' real.' We try to 
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make mathematical time an ontologically exhaustive account 
of time, but this results in making an identity where there is 
a difference. 
The attempt to make the mathematical concept of time do 
service for all phases of the experience of time generally 
takes the form of identifying time as a dimension, coordinate 
with the other dimensions of space. The school of relativists 
in physics, make use of such a simplification of time, which 
has been made possible largely because of the work of Min-
kowski. To Minkowiski, time is a ' fourth ' dimension; but 
if we examine the logic by which he achieves such an identity, 
we have not far to seek for the artificial forcing of two dis-
tinct meanings under the caption of one term. Mathematical 
time is claimed to be representable by the properties of a line. 
Now, at the very start, we must distinguish between the real 
lines of space and the abstract and conceptual lines of science. 
Real lines are indeed no more than trajectories or paths, and 
the familiar dial of a clock is able to pass muster as a measure 
of time because it is eloquent with the sugg:estions of a 
journey. And a journey is indifferently gauged in either 
units of time or space. For example, if you are one mile from 
home and in good health, you are also about twenty minutes 
from there. The clock is able to serve as our social standard 
because its real rate strikes an average to which we are 
synchronized by our biological history: its days journey is 
our days journey. The unit distances of the dial of a clock 
represent certain basic lapses of experience which we choose 
to regard as mensurating intervals. So far, indeed, we are 
not yet beyond subjective time at all. Like subjective time, 
the journey of the clock's hand is continuous. That is, its 
transition along its pathway is such that it is impossible to 
state in numerical terms its progress at any given instant. 
No matter how small an instant we choose, so long as it has 
a beginning and an end, the actual position of the hand be-
tween them is problematical. Mathematics deals only with 
the countable, hence to subject time to mathematical treat-
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ment, its flow must be rendered discrete. To this end, time 
i5', considered, not as sharing the properties of real time but 
of a purely conceptual one, wholly fictitious so far as direct 
experience is concerned. 
9. The inroad of the discrete notion of time is plainly 
evident in the fact, that although we begin by equating so 
much space for so much time, in practice this resolves itself 
in considering only the end points of such distances as repre-
senting time. For example, the rotating earth and the moving 
hands of the clock are typical time instruments of science, 
But w.hen the frequency of the clock's revolutions are adjusted 
to the revolutions of the earth, we are free to ignore entirely 
the real distances traversed by each. Instead, we merely 
count the successive recurrences of their motion. When the 
clock is so regulated that it makes two revolutions while the 
earth makes one, we disregard the actual distances traversed 
by each, and measure time merely by counting the revolutions 
of the hands. Now, a number as such' is no specific magni-
tude: it may stand for any magnitude whatever. Accordingly, 
this time of number is free from the suggestion of either a 
real space traversed or of a real time consumed in doing so. 
We are now dealing with mathematical time proper. It has 
unique properties which distinguish it at once from the im-
mediate, subjective time pf experience, or the time of journey-
ing represented by distances. The time of the clock is a fusion 
of the notion of mathematical time and of time as duration. 
Time as duration and the clock's time are alike at least in 
two important respects: both are continuous, and the occur-
rence of each is unique - unique in the sense that they occur 
but once. To be sure, we count each ' new ' rotation of the 
clock's hands, as only a repetition; but this is one of the 
characteristic conventions of mathematics. The uniformity 
of the clock's motion, the equality of its hours, depend on the 
seeming fact that the clock does not profit from its experi-
ences. Nevertheless, it endures in time in the sense that it 
progressively 'forgets' the form given it by its maker. Its 
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iime is the time of dissolution, yet just as real, ontologically 
speaking, as our time of progression and growth. Now the 
clock's time conceived above, is not yet suited to the needs of 
mathematics. For this, we require a concept of time which 
must at least fulfill three requirements: ( 1) Time must con-
sist of unit intervals subject to the operation of counting. 
(2) These units must be quantitatively equal so that any 
unit of time whatever its location in the series of time units, 
will be equal in value to any other time unit of its class. ( 3) 
The order of succession of these units must be subject to re-
versal and repetition. . 
These conditions once fulfilled, we have made the thinking 
of time in numbers possible; and this achievement marks the 
very apex of intellectual triumph. This potency of numbers 
is by far easier to employ in practice than to understand in 
principle. Indeed, could we unravel the mystery of their 
power we should be very near to the secret of all knowing. 
We shall find this problem challenging us in later chapters. 
Suffice it for our present purposes to ask whether it is pos-
sible to ascribe this triune of properties of . mathematical 
time to time as we live it? To even a casual inspection it 
would seem that the properties of mathematical time men-
tioned above but rival each other in doing violence to our 
experience of time. The time we li_ve is first of all contin-
uous, and this is violated by all three of the properties of 
mathematical time. The third one might be mistaken as an 
exception. It does not seem to specifically deny succession to 
time, but only assumes any given series of time units as re-
peatable. But it is precisely this assumption, that all repeti-
tions of a time interval are equal, which denies that any 
given occurrence of time is real. This belies experience, for 
here, nothing is real that is not particular. Real events, like 
real objects, are individual: nature does not supply any de-
eired number of repetitions of them free of charge. Only 
that affluent nature in which the intellect makes its home is 
so generous. Unhappily, the scientist lives in both realms at 
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once. So far as his laboratory problems, i.e., his intellectual 
problems are concerned, the scientist may well repeat an 
' afternoon ' of mathematical time so often as he chooses. All 
that is required is to set back the hands of the clock or to 
set the pendulum swinging anew. Meanwhile, however, he 
must endure a real time which occurs but once. The time he 
may waste in mistakes cannot be recovered so magically. 
10. In short, the mathematical conception of time is intel-
lectually useful but ontologically false: lived time is onto-
logically real, but useless in intellectual operations. And we 
are confronted again by the master enigma of our thesis: how 
can mathematical time be useful if it is not also ~mtologically 
true? In attempting to answer this question, we can proceed 
with some hope of success only so long as we remember that 
the problem is not solved by denying ' reality ' to either of 
the concepts of time which are involved. Of course, no 
quarrel ever arises between immediate experience and the 
notions that it finds useful. Epistemology does not arise in 
the case in hand until we raise experience to the conceptual 
level. Then follows the question, how can we reconcile its 
property of continuity with the discontinuity of mathematical 
time which measures it? 
We shall avoid the attempt to explain both of the concepts 
of time with which we are dealing in terms of the logic of 
one of them taken alone. The logic of mathematics surely 
is not adequate to the explanation of a problem which it has 
not created. This means that mathematics, which cannot 
proceed at all without the materials of discrete steps, will 
never be able to explain the continuous. Accordingly the 
attempt in mathematics to define a sort of discrete continuum 
is futile. In mathematics, it is the custom to distinguish be-
tween discrete, dense, and continuous classes. The discrete 
class owes its distinctiveness to the fact that it satisfies 
Dedekind's postulate, which requires that an element of a 
discrete class divide it into sub-classes. .A::. dense class is de-
fined as one in which any two elements will always have a 
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third element between them. A familiar example of a dense 
class is the class of points forming a line. No matter how 
close together two of its points may be, other points never-
theless exist between them. A continuous class is defined as 
a dense class but which also satisfies Dedekind's postulate. 
That is, it must be a class between whose elements other 
elements always occur to infinity, yet in which any particular 
element will divide the whole class into two distinct sub-
classes. Such a series will at once be dense and discrete; and 
the classic example given of it is again the class of points 
forming a line. 
Now if this conception were inviolable it would mark no 
Rmall victory for mathematics: it will mean that the antag-
onistic notions of the continuous and the discrete have found 
a reconciliation. The discrete will be fused with the con-
tinuous without the sacrifice of its discreteness, and Zeno's 
paradoxes would be at an end. Unfortunately, when we in-
spect this notion of a continuous class we find that instead of 
solving the paradox it only conceals it, and in rather ill dis-
guise. Consider the line which is supposed to exemplify the 
idea of the continuous class. It manages to appear at once 
as continuous and discrete by virtue of a certain kindly office 
of its points which take upon themselves the whole brunt of 
this miracle. When we choose to look for the property of 
discontinuity in our line, some of its points are required by 
the definition to hold themselves together by an inner force; 
and they thus serve as static nodal elements among the re-
maining points which continue in a perpetual welter of falling 
asunder into more and more points. In other words, we have 
here two radically different classes of points. Our mathe-
matical continuum gets its validity because we employ in its 
construction certain points which are not mathematical points 
at all. On the contrary, they lw,ve a concrete existence by 
virtue of the very fact tlw,t they resist division. Their space 
for once is ' real ' because it does not collapse into an infinity 
of infinitesimal spaces. Now, the difference between such 
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indivisible points and the infinitely divisible kind is just as 
great as the difference between. mathematical and durational 
time which we have all the time been trying to reconcile. How 
can mathematical and durational time be parts of the same 
experience? This is truly the same qquestion as to ask, 
" How can the infinitely divisible points of the dense class, 
and the indivisible points which define the discrete class co-
operate with each other in producing the ' same ' line? So 
far, mathematicians are not beyond sheer affirmation that 
they in fact do unite to form a continuum. 
11. But now we are out of the realm of speculation and 
find ourselves again in the realms of deeds and movements. 
The hands of the clock makes its continuous journey along 
its path, and yet its progress can be measured step-wise. 
Here there is no opposition between the continuous and the 
discrete. Return once more to reflection: the mathematical 
continuum at once bristles with the inherent hostility between 
unity and multiplicity. Strange to say, we cannot traverse 
a conceptual path even in thought. That is, we cannot tra-
verse the infinitely divisible points of this continuum be-
cause for every point traversed another one springs into 
existence at our feet. The indivisible points can be traversed, 
but here we never know that we make progress. In either 
case, we are left in a logical deadlock. 
Thus, science sets out in its customary way to explain the 
unknown by the known; which it regards at once as the 
process of explaining the complex by the simple. But what 
is simple to experience is not simple to the intellect. Now, in 
experience, a pathway is indeed a simple image of time, but 
to scientific reflection this same pathway becomes the embodi-
ment of bristling difficulties. Then, since we must solve the 
problem of time reflectively, we must turn to other forms of 
conscious experience for aid besides logical definition. Now, 
in volition and aesthetic experience, unity and multiplicity, 
coherence and divisibility loose the bald opposition they have 
so far exhibited. Stated in other and more crucial terms, 
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the fundamental difference between the time of science and 
the time of experience is that science regards the unique as 
inconsequential; whereas we must expect the unique in the 
time we live. The very reversibility of the clock and the uni-
formity of its time are due to its inability to profit from ex-
perience, as it were. A clock that should ' learn ' its task 
the better from day to day would become useless for our pur-
poses. Indeed, in this case it would have certain purposes of 
its own, otherwise, ' learning ' has no meaning. The time of 
the clock is uniform because it does not have a time of wait-
ing. It has no occasion either for delay or haste since it has 
no past from which it can profit. On the other hand, duration 
is real because it involves a real history and a real evolution. 
That is, it involves the striving for specific goals. 
3 
TIME AND ITS PREDICATES 
12. Just as science seeks to represent time by the simple 
image of a line, so it describes time by a single predicate: 
the category of the relative. Relativity might be termed the 
'black sheep' of the categories, for the association between 
relativism and scepticism has been most persistent in the 
history of thought from the day of Heraclitus with his uni-
verse of pure change. The notion of the unreality of time is-
the natural counterpart of the view that time is wholly rela-
tive to the human point of view. Now, the relative, as far as 
thought is concerned, is just as real as the absolute. Even if 
it were shown that time is purely relative, that is, purely 
' appearance,' ontologically considered, it is still real. And 
curiously enough, the ' appearances ' which the philosopher 
and scientist would disdain, somehow get themselves talked 
about far more than do the eternal verities that are supposed 
to crowd the appearances out of existence. What the rela-
tivists must mean, then, when they call time unreal is that 
time conceived as an absolute is unreal, i.e., is not verified by 
64 
Christian 0. Weber 
experience. If time is so completely relative that all of its 
characteristics can be represented as one dimension, then it 
is at least as real as the other three. In fine, the issue is 
solely to decide whether time is real in the sense that lines 
are real, or whether it possesses a sort of reality unknown to 
lines. Now, the lines of mathematics have only a conceptual 
existence. They are composed of an infinity of discontinuous 
points. Such lines are never met with in real experience. 
The lines which we experience are real paths, and it is pos-
sible to traverse them. But the points of the conceptual line 
can never be traversed. For no matter how many of them 
we scale, always an infinity of them still lies before us. But, 
no doubt, we really endure time, and consign it to our past. 
Hence, if time is to be considered a dimension, it cannot pos-
sibly be the dimension which is defined in mathematics. 
13. By relative we mean to indicate the dependence of the 
meaning of anything in comparison with something else. 
Explanation by comparison requires that the terms of this 
comparison have a common denominator. For example, time 
and space are alike in their point successions, says the devotee 
of Einstein. Time and space are relative in this case because 
both are explained by our reliance on a third or middle con-
cept, the concept of point. It will develop that this sort of 
definition is always definition by denotation; and its logic 
can be completely rendered in Euler diagrams. The category 
of the relative is therefore confined to the quantitative aspect 
of experience: it does not touch quality. It may be said that 
surely qualities are comparable in terms of their intensity, 
but reflection will show that in every idea of intensity there 
is hidden at once, as Bergson declared, the implication of 
space. The term qualitative intensity illegimately embodies 
two contradictory ideas. 
14. What must be the necessary meaning of the word abso-
lute? If it is not to encroach on the meaning of the word 
relative, this term must mean the signification of a thing as 
depending on itself alone. As Bergson has it, a thing is ab-
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solute by being absolutely what it is. It is at once obvious 
that this term is misapplied when we speak of absolute space. 
Space itself is none other than the field of 'anyness' where 
relations are found: this is its actual service to science. The 
points of space may be anywhere, and actually are nowhere 
until they are given a locus by a relation. The sum total of 
the points which we have charted forms a space which is 
purely relative. Yet, there is a sense in which space is qual-
itative and absolute, and that is the space which we actually 
traverse. We cannot say that a single atom or the whole 
universe of atoms is absolute because this involves the defini-
tion of a quantity in terms of itself, and this is meaningless. 
We would be no wiser if a tradesman were to tell us that a 
lump of butter is equal to itself in weight, it is necessary to 
define it in terms of other measures such as pounds, and 
ounces. But there is a sense in which all quantities are abso-
lute. Relatively speaking, a pound of butter is neither much 
or little. Its quantity can become an absolute only when the 
butter is lifted by someone. Its weight for each person that 
lifts it will be absolute: it will be absolutely the amount of 
effort it calls forth. Effort and the experience of time alone 
are undivided and this alone forbids relations. It will be ob-
jected that successive intervals of time may be related and 
compared, but such comparisons are always made of time 
which is already flown and quantified. When we declare that 
a certain period of time was 'short,' we still find that during 
this time our state of attention was intense: on the other 
hand, a period of time which seemed 'long' is a period of. 
waiting. Our judgments of ' long ' and ' ~hort' are therefore 
derived from the degree of tension of the mental state during 
which the time passed. But here we take advantage of a dual 
signification of the term intensity, and it is necessary to rescue 
this term from equivocation. It has misled psychological 
labors because it implies at once the ideas of quality and 
quantity. It has thus been illegimately employed as a means 
of measuring qualitative experience, a goal that has long 
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been dear, not to Weber and Fechner alone, but to scientists 
•of all ages too enamoured of mathematics for the good of 
psychology. There is in every sensation a reflection of the 
extensity which we must meet, but we meet this extensity 
with effort, which is more than so much quantity. The uni-
formity of the limens of psychophysics are therefore wholly 
deceptive. Time and effort, in a relative sense, have no ex-
periential meaning. 
15. In Newtonian physics time is considered in the sense 
of an eternal and uniform flow. In the literature of modern 
physical relativism, it is common to refer to the Newtonian 
conception as the "relativism of Newton," to distinguish it 
from the "relativism of Einstein." The relativism of New-
ton is supposed to result from the inference that since time 
is uniform in its flow, its actual rate, like the actual extent 
of distances, is negligible. This form of relativism is sup-
posed to be distinct from Einstein's in that the latter con-
siders the flow of time as relative to bodies, while Newton 
considered the flow of time as independent of bodies. Ex-
amination will show that the difference is a verbal orie. 
Underlying both conceptions is the notion that time is a literal 
flow, like that of water. Now, it is only a verbal difference 
whether we say that this flow is relative to bodies, as does 
Einstein, or that the motion •Of bodies is ·relative to the flow 
of time, as does Newton. A relation holds in either of its 
senses. If once we say, as does Newton, that time is absolute, 
we cannot then say that its absolute rate does not matter. 
Newton's time should be described as relatively absolute, and 
it would so be not one whit different from the time of Ein-
stein which is absolutely relative. Both descriptions, as De 
Morgan would perhaps say, go beyond all serious paradox, 
and conceptually belong to the class of " round squares " 
and "square circles." Clerk Maxwell is the author of the 
paradox which holds that should all bodies receive at the 
same time blows that would increase their motions by pro-
portionate amounts, the change would go undiscovered by us. 
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Poincare has invented a similar paradox in which it is argued 
that should the universe expand and contract its dimensions 
uniformly, man would not be able to discover it. In either 
case, the reason why the change goes undiscovered is because 
they are supposed to occur instantaneously, that is, the change 
from the one state to the other does not consume any time. 
And if it consumes no time it robs us of no effort. Now, these 
accounts derive their whole force as paradoxes from the fact 
that we cannot believe that space and time should be expanded 
and contracted without our being alive to the change. But if 
it is supposed that we ourselves have changed in a manner 
which leaves us adapted to the new world as to the old, then 
indeed no change at all has occurred. The paradox arises 
because we imagine that we have endured the change, but 
still retain in memory a knowledge of the smaller world which 
we just left. But in this case, there will be one thing, memory, 
which still belongs to the world before the miracle happened. 
In other words, we are talking about a change which makes 
no difference. Now, such a change is no change at all. 
16. The most fruitful lesson to be learned from all this is 
that the actual content of our concepts is far richer than we 
think. Here is a gap between our ideas and our ideas of our 
ideas. There is a difference between the idea of space which 
we really hold and the definition .we give to it. We define 
distances in terms of the unit distances comprising them, but 
lurking in our minds is the notion of the effort it will require 
to traverse it. In exact science, distances are understood in 
the first sense, and are expressed by numbers. Thus, there 
is saved from reality only its numerical aspect. So long as 
numbers are regarded as symbols of pure quantity, those 
quantities may be increased and decreased without affecting 
our thinking so long as the increases and decreases are pro-
portional. Hence the accuracy of maps. As geographers, 
the difference in size between the map and the area it repre-
sents is very nearly negligible. Not quite negligible, because 
however minute the map, its various points will still have to 
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be traversed when we gauge distances upon it, and hence 
will occasion a loss of time. As mathematicians, however, 
we reach the apex of the power of thought, for now distances 
are represented by figures, and these may represent any dis-
tance we please. Numbers come very near being shorn of all 
suggestion of time and labor. But, if we enquire into the 
inner meaning of numbers, we shall see that they too imply 
a history. Our map and our scale of miles are temporary 
devices, for the reason that the making of schemata is not 
the whole of life. As wayfarers, every distance is what it 
is in spite of our lordly habit of replacing it by a number in 
our calculations. In practice, we are bound to consider dis-
tances in terms of the efforts required to traverse them. The 
scale of miles we make as geographers will• show the same 
number of units that we shall find in traveling, but in travel-
ing we must do far more than merely count them. Counting, 
however, means some effort, and this accounts for the ability 
of numbers to form in miniature a substitute for experience. 
The convenient scale of miles which we store in memory has 
the one disadvantage that when the time for action arrives 
we must recall how much effort each number stands for. 
Each number must have restored to it, to the very end of 
the journey, the full measure of intension of which it was 
robbed for the sake of computation. This full measure must 
be returned in a varying proportion of intensification of effort 
and of extension of time. 
16. In the last analysis, the image of a line has served for 
the idea of time with such success because the line is prolific 
in its suggestion of a pathway, a distant goal, and all of the 
toil and chance of human wayfaring. Indeed, science chose 
far better than it knew, for this drab image of the line is rich 
with reminiscence of life with its infinity of points striving 
haplessly at continuity; and the line eloquently bespeaks a 
certain characteristic of time as lived, namely, the defeats 
encountered along the pilgrimage and the dissolution of death. 
These faltering points, spinning themselves out infinitely in 
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bootless endeavor at progress, are indeed but the images of 
our own footsteps. The notion of a dead atom driven by blind 
forces was intended by science to transcend the human point 
of view; but both have betrayed their human derivation. The 
atom turns out to be a miniature chaldron of weltering forces; 
and as for the forces themselves, they are but counterfeits of 
the human will. We even suppose that physical forces follow 
the path of least resistance, as though they were obliged, like 
human strength, to economize in order to keep from perishing. 
Newton would represent the universe as existing without 
cost. But every fact of life, beginning with the chlorophyll 
of the plants, ever engaged in saving sunlight from being 
eternally lost in the form of heat, shows what is really going 
on in Newton's vain universe of silent stuff, maintaining an 
unchallenged reign over a realm of limitless space. Existence 
is not unchallenged, but hangs on a strand woven of will and 
thought. " No thinking without phosphorous," says the 
materialist: " No phosphorous without thought," answers 
the idealist. Both statements are true, and they portray crea-
tive imagination, the very essence of life, moving in a uni-
verse whose sole bread is the lump of necessity leavened with 
a little spice of freedom. 
17. Thus, we might justify the precepts of Protagoras at 
length. Ideas which clarify our thought turn out to be fancied 
duplicates of our selves, whose pantomime performances we 
watch like so many avid crystal-gazers, waiting for a revela-
tion of fate. And crystal-gazing and thinking are alike in 
that the visions attained in each are in reality but the fore-
shadowings from hidden recesses within our souls. It is 
miracle enough to learn the process by which such inner acts 
can clothe themselves in borrowed garb. But the greatest 
miracle of all is the reverence in which we hold these ideal 
people we have ourselves created. The perennial freshness 
of Plato, I imagine, lies largely in his simple and beautiful 
faith that ideas hail from a sacred transcendental realm. Man 
may create Gods in their own images, but they are Gods 
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nevertheless, and here we come upon a characteristic of 
thought concerning which neither experimentation or logical 
analysis will give us further wisdom. Primally, thought 
points not solely at truth, but at goodness; and this property 
is one which addresses itself, not to our reason, but to con-
science. 
4 
THE GOOD MAN AS MEASURE 
18. The intellect moves by preference in a punctiform 
space. But this space yet has one trait which the intellect 
fain' would banish. The trait is the infinite extension of 
space and the infinite divisibility of its points. At bottom, 
even space is not given once for all. Now this very fluidity 
of the concept of space, which permits points to be anywhere 
indicates the existence of a conquering will which would 
mould reality into an exact image of its purposes. The very 
notion of abstract space is a superb scheme permitting the 
greatest range to the creative imagination, for in it, any con-
figuration may occupy any position. So also, Minkowski's 
time, far from being given once for all, is as infinitely elastic 
as the points of its trajectory are infinite in number. The 
infinite subdivisibility of space-time is the conceptual symbol 
representing the infinite pbssibilities which a higher tension 
of life might find in any moment. Dimensionless points and 
instantaneous instants are surds to reason, but not to our 
wills, and again we arrive at the result: the inert is ex-
plained by the living. Fundamentally, then, the rule "man is 
the measure " does not arise out of any ontological necessity, 
but rather out of a teleological condition. Onthologically, we 
may satisfy the intellect by positing a space of limited points 
given once and for all, but we do so at the cost of a certain 
spiritual surrender. Such a space becomes lucidity to reason 
at the cost of becoming a prison to the creative aspects of our 
nature. We instinctively reason from experience to formal 
knowledge because experience brings certain truths to us 
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which formal knowledge excludes. Like an instinct, our 
thought moves not out of blind response to forces from be-
hind, but because of desired ideal goals that lie ahead. Were 
we shorn of all capacity save that of an effortless mathe-
matical contemplation, we could for once countenance the 
perfect lucidity of materialism. But so long as we contain 
the germ of idealization, the lucidity of materialism is all 
madness. And our rebellion is supported by history. Ma-
terialism has ever been the excuse of gross hedonism for its 
weakness, of cowards for their failure, of tyrants for their 
cruelty. The view that men are machines is far less an error 
of logic than it is an error of disloyalty to the hope of ·life. 
This hope comprises the common-sense of mankind by which 
Descartes, rationalist though he was, sought to be guided. 
Any theory of life which humanity consistently refuses to 
accept is subject to suspicion for error. The entire history 
of philosophy is monument to the fact that pure dialectic, 
however tireless and subtle, has failed to disturb the na'ive 
thought stubborn conviction of mankind that. men have free-
dom in time; and this in spite of the fact that in the 
academic occupations of Minkowski space has unceremon-
iously swallowed up everything else. 
To understand the meaning of time in its fulness, we need 
to transcend the point of view of •facts and inferences. We 
are bound to reality by other ties than by the ties of logical 
consistency. We are bound by ties of loyalty to forces in the 
universe which expect of us another sort of consistency. 
"We grant that life is mean," exclaimed Emerson, " but how 
did we find out that it is mean?" Indeed, how is meanness 
ever to be understood except through the impulse to right it? 
Now, to make possible a life of active loyalty it is necessary 
to have a conception of the universe in which we may feel 
"volitionally at home," as James expressed it. We demand 
a universe in whkh there will be completely satisfied our in-
exorable sense that we possess creative powers which must 
be loyal to other creative powers beyond. But such a uni-
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verse is flatly denied by our modern physical cosmologists 
who assert that not only the quantity of the universe is given 
once and for all, but that the time succession of its states is 
rigidly fixed. 
My argument but repeats an ancient belief of Saint Anselm 
to the effect that we have a faculty within us which believes 
first and then understands. In this it is unlike the intellect 
which understands first and then believes. Our freedom, for 
example, certainly rests, largely if not entirely, on our con-
viction that we have it. It is a commonplace of every-day 
life that responsibility has to be taught. This issue, mechan~ 
ism versus vitalism, does not rest entirely on demonstrations 
of fact: it is an issue whose truth is made either the one way 
or the other. The doctrine of Minkowski that time is a fourth 
dimension creates an utterly alien world for a normally en-
dowed human being. Now, this is because the vital part of 
this ' normal endowment ' consists of the healthy conviction 
that we are free moral agents. The deterministic cosmology, 
so popular in the classroom becomes from this point of view 
the world of the madman who is dominated by the fixed idea 
that his every thought and act is forced upon him. Is it 
possible that we possess two faculties of understanding, one 
suited to the formally rational pursuits of the class-room, the 
other suited to the demands of the life of moral achievement? 
This is the central theme of the following chapter. 
III 
TYPES OF LOGIC IN RELATION TO THE CONCEPT OF TIME 
1 
FORMS OF UNDERSTANDING 
19. Our problem has considerably altered its dimensions. 
We began with the ambition to discover how a reputed time-
less knowledge could portray an experience so replete with 
the savor of time. But now this project, so baldly and 
meagerly stated, is set in broader measures. For an enquiry 
into the nature of time has shown that bare concept, whether 
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of time as dimension or time as continuum, borrowing its 
meaningfulness from three very intimate experiences, 
namely: purposive pursuit of some moral or aesthetic value, 
toil of pursuing, risk of failure. 
In short, we are face to face with the possibility that the 
timefulness of experience is nowhere so intensive as in the 
processes of our thinking; for it is just here that the vision 
of goals, the labor of creation, and the risks of defeat are at 
their height. But the formal or intellectual mode of reason-
ing deals only with identities existing between existential 
elements; therefore, the desireful, creative, and risk-bearing 
phases of thought remain inexplicable in its terms. They are 
intelligible only to another faculty of understanding, a faculty 
which is exercised by our moral natures. This, at any rate, is 
the thesis of our present chapter. 
20. Historically, the revolt against Hegelianism marks the 
reassertion of the belief that the intellect is but part of a 
larger human understanding. This belief points at once to 
a principle of method, namely: that since our complete rea-
son is moulded on an external reality, the lineaments of the 
latter may be to some extent inferred from the bare fact that 
some things are thinkable and others are not so. A profound 
consequence attaches to this; namely that epistemology con-
tributes to the content of ontology. That is, the nature of 
our thinking reveals the nature of the world which we think 
about. Hegelianism makes a dangerous use of this principle 
simply because it considers formal reasoning as the only rea-
soning of which we are capable.1 When, therefore, it infers 
a monism of being from its forced monis mof knowledge it 
deceives itseif about reality only because it has already done 
violence to human nature. 
1 Professor Bosanquet, the bearer of the Hegelian intellectual tradi-
tion, seeks to regard even willing as an ideational process. In his 
Psychology of the Moral Self, (p. 79 ff.). he attempts to interpret an 
act of decision as " more like that of being absorbed in an idea than 
like that of giving effect to desire . . . " 
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21. However, if we begin by examining our mode of under-
standing we shall see that understanding makes use, not of 
one tool, but of several. Human minds have, not one form of 
understanding, they have at least three of them. St. Anselm 
was rightly led to infer that goodness and fact are so diverse 
in their natures that they must be attained by totally different 
logics. Yet, a most persistent attempt to make the one form 
of thought swallow the others has been a main ambition of 
philosophers since Plato. Plato was a monist in the sense 
that he regarded all reality as ideal in nature. But we must 
beware of confusing Plato's concept of the idea with that of 
certain modern schools. His ideas were at once forms and 
values; 2 and in this Plato implicitly recognizes the duality of 
fact and value for which we here plead. Fact and value rep-
resent two forms of knowledge, not one; their identification 
is impossible; considered as objects of knowledge, they are 
entirely unlike. What is more, each of them is attained by 
a unique logical procedure. In two respects, however, they 
are alike : both are recognized by the same mind, and both 
are verified in its experiences. In the end, we must ask how 
these two ways of knowing can function harmoniously in the 
same experience, and in the service of the same subject. 
2 
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN FORMAL AND 
MORAL REASON 
22. The history of epistemology presents a succession of 
attempts to overcome that dualism of our thinking which is 
represented by the contrast between otJ,r formal and our 
moral modes of comprehension. Aristotle wrestled with their 
opposition in his separation of the active from the passive 
reason. St. Anselm acknowledged this dualism of thought in 
his opposition of reason to faith. The difficulty reappars in 
Kant's distinction between pure reason and practical reason. 
2 H. B. Alexander, Poetry and the Individual, 1906, p. 169. 
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Bergson's distinction between intellect and intuition repre-
sents a modern version of the problem and his work leaves 
the dualism of knowledge clearer now than ever before. 
If the distinction between formal and moral reasoning is 
valid, it should be possible to demonstrate t~at they rest on 
entirely different psychological processes, and make use of 
entirely different logical assumptions. Such a differentiation 
between formal and moral logic is provided for by an analysis 
which we owe to H. B. Alexander. 3 He indicates two psycho-
logically distinct modes of thought, and derives them from 
two equally distinct modes of experience. 
"There are two habits or modes of thought essential to 
all reflection which are responsible for the main puzzle of 
philosophy and the inherent contradictoriness of reason. 
The antithesis to which they give rise has been variously 
designated. With the Greeks it was the contradiction of 
the one and the many, of being and becoming; with the 
moderns it is the problem of identity in difference, or, in 
natural science, of uniformity and variation. All these 
antitheticals arise from the contemplation of the thing, 
that which suffers change yet remains self-identical. In 
the mind's history the puzzle has found various solutions. 
In aesthetics reconciliation is effected by the notion of, 
harmony; in psychology, by the conception of person-
ality; in natural science, by the doctrine of evolution." 
" The two habits are the instinct for identification, or 
the psychological experience of recognition, and the in-
stinct for ascribing causes, due to the experience of voli-
tion,- that is, the power of thinking and willing, which 
in joint operation constitute human efficiency. It is the 
instinct of causal thinking which induces the primitive 
mind to animate all Nature with will and intention. In 
is the instinct for forming definite and responsible esti-
mates of things which leads to those composite impres-
sions that we call ideas." 
Let us call that mode of thought which arises out of the 
experience of volition, the logic of morals. The other mode 
3 H. B. Alexander, Nature and Human Nature, 9hicago, 1923, pp. 
59-60. 
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of thought, which proceeds by finding identities, we may ca11 
formal logic. Can it be established that these have different 
objects of knowledge, are different as to their processes, and 
serve different functions? 
23. As for the 'objects' of these two forms of thought, 
their 'real' object is the same: both point to things. Yet, 
they interest themselves in different aspects of things. 
Things may be regarded solely as evistents, as facts which 
exist now. On the other hand, things have values, and these 
values are independent variables. Facts, we say, are true. 
They represent reality itself; and when we ask whether a 
fact is true, we readily acknowledge that it is our notion of 
the fact which we question, and not fact as such. Values too 
exist, but their existential status is quite unique. They do 
not have a conserved and quantitative existence, but they 
nevertheless exist because 'they make a difference,' as the 
pragmatists would say. They are potent forces, and because 
of their significance for us, their reality is far less alien than 
the reality of matter which is still a stranger to physics and 
chemistry. Values have a certain embodiment in things. 
This permits us to distinguish between two aspects of 
'things,' their real conformations as contrasted with the 
potentialities they possess. It is our moral reason which in-
terests itself in values, and our intellect which interests it-
self in facts. It is the moral reason which is born of that 
wonder of which Plato speaks. Moral reason ever finds 
problems to be solved, though it is formal reason which dis-
covers the means for its solution. 
24. The methods of these logics are as fully at variance as 
their ends. Formal logic proceeds by demonstration, of 
which the syllogism of logic and the proposition of geometry 
are the models. Moral logic proceeds by a method more akin 
to conviction or conversion. The essential difference between 
these methods is, that demonstration proceeds step-wise, 
while conversion proceeds to belief by a continuous process 
resembling growth. For example, the syllogism breaks up 
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into three distinct judgments, and each judgment breaks up 
into a subject and a predicate. On the other hand, our 
allegiance to values grows upon us so continuously that we 
can divide it into stages only by an artificiality. The "ladder 
of faith" devised by William James 4 show how we proceed 
from indifference to a value to full loyalty to it. James dis-
tinguishes seven steps in his ' faith-ladder ': 
" 1. There is nothing absurd in certain views of the 
world being true, nothing self-contradictory; 
2. It might have been true under certain conditions; 
3. It may be true, even now; 
4. It is fit to be true; 
5. It ought to be true; 
6. It must be true; 
7. It shall be true, at any rate true for me." 
If we examine these stages closely, we shall see that run-
ning through them there is a continuous augmentation of 
belief. Nor can we even say that our belief in an ethical 
truth-claim has a definite beginning and a definite end. Here, 
the ' truth ' grows upon us by degrees; and, in fact, we are 
seldom if ever able to say of a moral worth whether we have 
realized its full meaning or not. In th~ moral sphere, we 
' dream ' our way through life in a true sense. There is, 
indeed, a certain characteristic of dreams which we may 
characterize as a certain disorganization of values. This 
'displacement' of values in the dream is perhaps responsible 
for most of its bizarre character. One dreams, perhaps, of 
being in the midst of a great fire, but without the fear 
typical of waking life; and it is this feature of the dream 
which causes us to call it 'strange.' Things which in waking 
life arouse us to ardor may leave us indifferent in the dream; 
and conversely, happenings which do not stir us in waking 
life may pervade the dream with an atmosphere of great con-
cern. Perhaps the bizarre events and deeds of the dream 
are really the consequence of these bizarre evaluations; and it 
4 William James, Some Problems of Philosophy, 1911, Appendix. 
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is this 'transvaluation of values' in the dream which make 
the dream seem distorted to waking consciousness. Now, 
this characteristic of dreams differs from waking life only 
in degree. Even in our most conscious moments we are dream-
ing ideals. · That is, we tend to weave a web of ideality about 
the things we encounter and the events which we endure, as 
though our minds would fain discover in them some . worth 
which their appearance would seem to deny. And, as in the 
case of the dream, our idealizations often have a bizarre 
character, but like the dreamer, we cannot see this ourselves 
while we weave them. While dreaming, we do not call our-
selves dreamers, except in those rare instances when we pass 
quickly from a stage between sleeping and waking. Now, 
there are also rare instances of waking life when we are 
able to catch ourselves in the midst of those fugues which 
haunt the moral sphere of existence. Such rare instances 
are also cases in which we awaken to. a higher leval of ex-
istence, or to a heightened tension of life. Illustration will 
make clear what we mean. There are moods which occa-
sionally lift us out of the atmosphere of practical daily life, 
and during them this daily life appears curiously warped. 
It may impress us as a phantasy in which we see ourselves 
pursuing baubles whose gloss has now lost all charm for us. 
When we survey the pilgrimages .and crusades of old we are 
half tempted to regard them as performanced by dream-
walkers, moved by an ideal that is only half-articulate. And 
in our own day, especially during the late war and after, we 
have been living in a mental state which seems to have as 
many difficulties with dream as with reality. Our indiffer-
ence to the brutality of war and the crimes which still re-
verberate from it, is a complete analogy to the dreamer who 
mingles with ferocious beasts without thought of fear. 
Various occurrences in different parts of the world may be 
very swords of Damocles hanging over civilization. What 
proves us to be dreamers is our indifference to the possibility 
of moral gain or loss. Meanwhile, our attention is centered 
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upon football and radio as though destiny waited _upon them. 
These warped values correspond to the fallacies of formal 
logic. They indicate a certain incompetence of thought and 
confusion of thought materials. It is the business of all 
thinking to conquer a certain chaos which confronts it: 
formal reason must distinguish between real facts and illu-
sions, moral reason must distinguish between genuine values 
and pseudo-values. 
It is indeed hard to say in real life who the dreamers are. 
Copernicus was hailed as a dreamer, but the outcome of his 
heliocentric theory clearly proves that it was his critic who 
dreamed. Just so, democracy is a clear idea which has 
emerged from many attempts to formulate it. On the other 
hand, the self-appraised 'realty' of the Prussian state has 
turned out to be a warped phantasy, wholly unsuited to life. 
We but flatter ourselves when we speak of 'clear conscious-
ness.' In dreams, too, we often invent phrases which seem 
weighted with great truth and perfect clarity; but in waking 
we discern thereni only obscure suggestions of meaning, 
which leave us astonished at their emptiness. Our ideas of 
value never become absolutely clear. This is to say that 
values never get out of the realm of becoming, just as facts, 
by definition, are confined to the world of being. Unlike 
facts, the reality of moral values is not guaranteed. Their 
existence depends on the unyielding allegiance of those who 
cherish them. 
25. There are three great ideals which we regard as the 
most general or inclusive: beauty, truth, and goodness. The 
type of reality we ascribe to these is quite unique. The 
reality of physical objects is constituted by their resistance 
to our invasion of the space they occupy. Their very unchang-
ing character shows that time does not affect them. They 
endure in time only in the sense that we provide this duration 
for them in our memories. A library serves as an extension 
of memory only because we remember where it is, and the 
alphabet with which it is to be interpreted. Duration in time 
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is always made possible by something which is not entirely 
inscribed in space. If memory consists of a neural impression 
and nothing more, we should be utterly at a loss to recall a 
single experience unless we " remember " where, in the brain, 
the "memories" are stored. That is, to remember where 
our many memories are located in the brain it would be neces-
sary to have a register or 'card index' of some sort. But 
a register too is a material thing, and it would be necessary 
to have another register to inform us as to what is recorded 
on each of its cards, and so on to infinity. In short, to be 
inscribed· in space is no guarantee of persistence in time. 
Thus, our ' wax tablet ' memory is able to do service only 
because th.ere exists a physical memory which is able to 
utilize it. 
Now, the reality of ideals is not at all due to the property 
of unchanging duration. We acknowledge the concrete ex-
istence of goodness and beauty because of their attraction, 
just as we are led to acknowledge the existence of physical 
objects because of their resistance to our strength. Ideals 
are real, not because they are unchanging, but because they 
are changing. Liberty, mercy, courage, nobility, beauty, and 
goodness, retain always the same names, but in each of them 
every person may gradually see more and more or less and 
less. It is because values and ideals rest on our loyalty and 
faith in them, that they are always to some extent haunted 
by slumber and dreams. It is in the sphere of values that we 
are perhaps most likely to be overcome by slumber. There 
is a certain fugitive essence of ' make-believe ' about our first 
devotions to ideals of all sorts. Experience of an art gallery 
may give evidence of this. We may gaze at a painting re-
puted to be great with a curious mixture of impulses; but 
until we actually discern its greatness, some of these im-
pulses, representing themselves as more real, constantly ob-
trude themselves ; so that we are npt sure, so long as we are 
novices in art, whether we are attracted by beauty or driven 
by mere curiosity or by the impulse to imitate others. The 
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devotion of the populace to some social or political ideal in-
volves a similar dreamy uncertainty, at the beginning. This 
is why great causes require great leaders; and the great 
leader is marked by his confidence that the cause he serves 
" is fit to be true." Causes are " clarified " by a sort of in-
sight quite different from the clarity that characterizes the 
syllogism. A cause is made true by our devotion to it. 
26. Formal reasoning succeeds best when wish and will 
elements are entirely excluded. On the other hand, without 
wish and will we should never arrive at conviction in the 
moral sphere. To be convinced of the truth of a value it is 
first of all necessary to experience some want which the 
attainment of this value is able to satisfy. We arrive at a 
conclusion regarding the value in question just to the degree 
in which this vague and uncertain need becomes clear and 
certain. In the sphere of formal reasoning on the other hand, 
the first necessity is to be somewhat puzzled. One cannot 
solve a problem until the problem is seen, we say. Now, 
intelligence consists precisely in the capacity to see a problem; 
and intelligence alone has nothing to do with the desire to 
solve it. Perhaps the source of the greatest uncertainty of 
the 'mental-age scales' so much in vogue is that they rest 
upon as assumed willngness of the subject to solve the prob-
lems presented in the tests. In formal logic we go from 
state of being to solution by means of discrete steps, during 
which each step brings something conceptually 'new.' The 
whole process of formal education has this step-wise charac-
teristic of the syllogism. We go to college to learn thos~ 
things which we do not already know. If we learn by the 
method of repetition, this is for the sake of a verbal memory 
which cannot be otherwise acquired. That "two plus two 
equals four." is not made more true by repeating the state-
ment in a loud voice; its truth is necessary and universal, as 
the Hagelians say. Yet, curiously enough, there is such 
magic in mere repetition when we come to the sphere of 
values. Values are made more true for us when we hear 
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them repeated by others. For example, the rituals of the 
church are the strongholds of ecclasiasticism, and we often 
attend services expressly to see them, though for the thous-
andth time. "In the logic of morals, example is much more 
eloquent for persuasion than is precept. Not that moral con-
viction is carried by the fact that so many people accept a 
certain vaule. Indeed, progress in the moral sphere is often 
due to the fact that some one individual will conceive and 
adhere to some new ideal; and we are convinced by the very 
&incerity of his devotion. In formal logic, on the other hand, 
we verify the validity of a class by enumerating the cases 
which support it. 
Satire too holds a unique place in the psychology of reason-
ing. In matters subject to formal demonstration, resort to 
sarcasm frequently results from paucity of arguments. 
Failing to convince the mind of an opponent, we content our-
selves with belaboring him. But in the case of values, it is 
quite different for here satire plays a legitimate role. Clever-
ness has only a limited power of arousing moral insight. In 
fact, our intellectual ingenuity quite- regularly outruns our 
appreciation of values. It was the danger of this that led 
Sir Oliver Lodge to hope that sub-atomic force may not be 
discovered by man, until he adds to his spiritual stature, else 
his cleverness may be the source of his own destruction. 
27. Finally, the first principles of these logics are quite 
different. H. B. Alexander 5 indicates the basic principles 
assumed by each as follows: 
" The assumption of human progress is to the logic of 
morals what the assumption of the uniformity of nature 
is to the logic of science. Like the assumption of uni-
formity, it is unprovable, and as in the case of the 
assumption of uniformity, there are many faults of ex-
perience that appear to go against it. Both assumptions 
are, in fact, articles of faith; neither is obvious fact, and 
neither rests upon compelling reason. Nevertheless, 
each is the foundation for all the rationality that is pos-
----
5 H. B. Alexander, Nature and Human Nature, 1923, p. 122. 
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sible in a whole department of human thought - the 
assumption of uniformity in the structural analysis of 
the world, the assumption of progress in its teleological 
analysis. Science and morals respectively .are the births 
of these two great fiducial articles of thought." 
We will develop these distinctions in a few paragraphs. 
In our moral reflection, we assume reality to be plastic, so 
that it can be altered to suit the ideals we cherish. We 
assume, not only the plasticity of the objective world, but the 
efficacy of our wills. We assume the reality of creative 
power; just as in formal logic we assume the fixity of struc-
ture. In this world of formal logic, the only kind of knowl-
edge which is permitted is the knowledge represented by 
identities and differences discovered between things which in 
themselves exist once and for all. This sort of thinking rests 
on the principle of similarity. On the other hand, there is 
the principle of causality which lays it down that the universe 
is such that the unique is possible.6 Upon this principle rests 
the logic of morals. 
The contention that there is a logic of morals, having its 
own object of knowledge, its own processes, and its own 
standard of verification, is a daring departure from wide-
spread belief, which will have it that the Aristotelian prin-
ciple of contradiction is the accredited touchstone of all rea-
soning. Is it possible to establish a class of truths which the 
Aristotelian principle is unable to touch? It is necessary first 
to determine what Aristotle's conception of it is, and what 
is its scope. 
The principle of contradiction can be stated either posit-
ively or negatively. Stated positively, it is commonly known 
as the law of identity. The law of identity assumes that all 
things remain self-identical. Stated negatively, this law 
6 The problem of the meaning of causality has called forth a vast 
literature, and we ignore it at present only for the purpose of setting 
forth our view of causality. In due time, we shall consider the famous 
historical views of Aristotle, Hume, Bergson, and others. 
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reads, " It is impossible for the same thing both to be a, and 
not to be a; or, a is not not-a." 7 It is necessary to ask, first 
of all, whether these laws are supposed to hold true of 
reality, which is the object of thought; or whether they are 
m~rely conditions upon which our thinking must proceed if 
it is to be successful. With the claim that these are necessary 
laws of thought in formal logic, we have no quarrel; but we 
maintain that there is a mode of thinking in which this law 
is useless. In fact, moral reflect.ion requires a principle which 
is exactly the opposite of this law; that is, it will assume that 
radical change is not incom'J)(l,tible with identity. As for the 
implications of these laws for the reality about which we 
think, it is necessary to take several distinctions into account. 
If we take these laws to mean, so far as they concern reality 
that particular things also remain self-identical while dura-
tion is taking place, they are obviously false unless taken in 
one of two special senses. If a bit of wax loses its form, the 
change of form is absolute so far as the wax is concerned. 
Not so, however, for a living subject who remembers its past 
form, and therefore retains in imagination the power of re. 
storing this past state ideally. It is this potency of memory 
which eventually enables the subject to restore the past form 
of an object in actuality. Again, the substance of the wax 
is not subject to the same sort of fortuity as is its form. Its 
total substantial quantity remains the same in spite of the 
dissolution of its particular form. Even if the bit of wax is 
' lost ' to human ownership, its substance is supposed to exist 
somewhere in the universe. But in this case, its substance 
ic conserved only if the entire universe is, since it may be 
anywhere in the universe. Since the mass of our particular 
object has escaped to parts of the universe which we cannot 
designate, we can 'save' it only by 'saving' the entire uni-
verse; just as the proverbial needle lost in the hay is saved 
only by saving all of the hay in which it is lost. That is, 
7 James E. Creighton, An Introductory Logic, N. Y., 1914, p. 350. 
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our object seems lost only to our knowledge, but not in reality. 
But is there here any possibility of maintaining the distinc-
tion between that which is saved in reality and that which is 
saved to knowledge? We think not; because the conserva-
tion of the total universe is a matter which formal measures 
are unable to determine. The conservation of the material 
totality of the universe, so far as quantitative determinations 
are concerned, is subject to neither proof nor disproof. For, 
if the universe should increase in its total amount, we should 
never discover this by making quantitative comparisons, 
since there is no outlying universe with which we can com-
pare it. Even if there were such a standard, we would have 
no way of proving whether or not it was constant in its 
amount. The same objection applies to out scientific instru-
ments of precision. If they contract and expand with the 
total universe, so far as these measures as such are concerned, 
they could not settle the question whether the universe is 
eonserved or not. The new school of relativists in physics 
have made systematic use of these facts. There is another 
matter that deserves mention. If the increase or the de-
crease of the amount of the universe involved some specific 
part of it instead of the uniform and general change which 
we have heretofore supposed, we should still be in difficulty. 
For, to detect such a local change, it is necessary to apply our 
instrument of measure locally, but in this case the instrument 
would suffer the change which - we intended to measure. 
Again, if our imaginary increase or decrease affected only 
certain kinds of substances, so that brass were subject to 
fluctuations of volume while iron were not, there would seem 
to be a possibility of applying an iron standard to measure 
the quantitative changes of the brass. However, we are of 
course unable to say whether it is the brass which changes 
or the iron, so far as the findings as such are concerned. To 
be sure, if we should visibly discern the changes in the piece 
of brass, we have two other interpretations open to us. First-
that we suffer an hallucination, or second, that such a change 
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in mass is actually occurring. But in this latter case, be it 
noted that our judgment rests upon a most unique instrument 
of precision, the sense-organs, and everything appears to 
indicate that it does its measuring in a way which is quite 
distinct from that of the instrument of the laboratory. So 
far as instrumental measures are concerned, we are in a 
perpetual doubt as to the conservation of the totality of the 
universe. But grant that our instruments maintain constant 
units, we are still in perpetual doubt as to whether or not 
the needle is 'conserved' even while we hold it in our hands. 
For the increment of increase or decrease which it undergoes 
may be infinitely smaller than the smallest measure which we 
employ. Here again we are at a loss to press the distinction 
between saved in reality and saved to knowledge. 
So much for the Aristotelian law, when applied to the total 
universe. It is subject to neither proof nor disproof, so far 
as quantitative measures are concerned; and the same is true 
for particular objects or for local changes. But there is still 
another way in which we should become aware of such 
changes. It is possible to gauge the permanency of a quan-
tity, not with the balances, but with the constancy of its re-
sistance to voluntary effort. There might be in this case 
an awareness of change even though the balances should 
change with everything else. By voluntary effort, we mean 
a sort of effort which involves creative labor: which is by 
definition not subject to quantitative multiplication. This 
last point will, of course, be disputed. But if effort be sub-
ject to the same proportionate increase or decrease as that 
which the objects lifted themselves endure, then we are face 
to face with a ' difference ' which makes no difference; and 
if the increment of increase or decrease in the mass of the 
bodies were so minute as to escape detection, we are again 
dealing with a difference which makes no difference. Is it 
not possible that the sole business of the Aristotelian law, and 
the logical system which rests upon it, to deal only with the 
universe in its static aspect? That is, with such changes as 
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do not affect us at all, or whose effects are so small as to be 
of no concern to us? Before accepting this interpretation we 
must consider others which are current. 
28. The Aristotelian principle is sometimes interpreted to 
mean that there is a persistence of identity in spite of change. 
Verbally, at least, this would seem to be an express denial 
of it, but since this version of it is given by good authorities, 8 
it should be examined. What meanings may be attached to 
the notion of the persistence of identity in the midst of 
change? It may mean, that a thing may change in one re-
spect but remain unchanged in others; as the frozen water 
of a piece of ice ·may change its form in melting, yet be the 
same quantum of substance. Now, in what sense is this true? 
The properties of elements are the only signs by means of 
which we are able to identify them. New combinations of 
elements invariably give new properties, and we are in a 
perpetual doubt to know whether they have changed in sub-
stance or not. Nor can chemistry help us here, for the prob--
lem is not one of identity of kind, but of individuality of 
quantum. We revive here the threadbare problem of sub-
stance and accident, though we need interest ourselves only 
in one point concerning it, and that point fairly obvious, 
namely, that if substance is something totally different from 
'accidents,' or, in more modern terms, totally different from 
properties, then we shall never know, from instrumental 
measures alone, whether substances persist unchanged when 
they are combined. Nevertheless, there is still a legitimate 
sense in which we may speak of the substance of a thing. 
After combining substances in various ways, we are able to 
restore or recover each of them by chemical analysis. Per-
haps the absolute substance of a thing is a notion which has 
grown out of such experiences. We do not mean that sub-
stance refers specifically to our power of creating the simili-
tudes of the past states of objects. We do mean, that this 
experience of ours with things convinced us that there is 
8 B. Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. II, 1911, Oxford, p. 210. 
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something enduring about them, which is not destroyed by 
combining them with other substances. There is something 
within them which plays a constant role in enabling us to 
restore past states s.o successfully. Thus the Aristotelian 
law, assuming the persistence of specific, essences is made 
possible by that which is not so 'given,' namely, the reality 
of human power. 
But the doctrine, identity in the- midst of change, can be 
illustrated otherwise: we selected a case that is against it. 
Consider a bit of wax which retains all of its properties ex-
cept that of form, which is subject to certain alterations. 
But in this case, the difficulty is that we really regard our 
object as a situation; and we merely say that in this situation, 
the form is an independent variable. That is, we secure the 
identity in the midst of change by taking the object as at 
once singular and plural. We get change by exclusive atten-
tion to the form, and then get identity by shifting the atten-
tion to the other properties of the wax. Our object is really 
a constellation of objects, and we exercise the illegitimate 
privilege of taking form as exclusively representing the ob-
ject, only to give this up in favor of the other properties of 
the wax. Thus, we demonstrate a simultaneous identity and 
change at the expense of the untenable notion of a simul-
taneous unity and plurality. 
But there is another way out of this difficulty. This con-
sists in making use of the notion of successive time rather 
than that of simultaneous time. From this point of view we 
may apply the Aristotelian principle to complex objects with-
out inconsistency. Our law will now read: objects remain 
self ~identical in tke respects in which they do not change. 
Or, if our object is indeed simple, our law says that it cannot 
at once be a and not-a. That is, if it is to change, this change 
cannot be accomplished without the passage of time. The 
Aristotelian principle, then, does not deny that change can 
occur; it simply states that until a change does occur, the 
thing remains self-identical. . Is this a principle which serves 
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to prove itself? Rather, it is a device which verbally saves 
itself from the need of verification. But it is a device which 
may nevertheless serve to guide thought: and we think that 
this is really the great service which the Aristotelian law 
gives to formal reasoning. 
29. So far, we have devoted ourselves to an analysis of 
what the Aristotelian law must mean. We find, that standing 
alone, it is the chief of those hypotheses whose great charac-
teristic is that they serve to guide thought and research, 
though they are not themselves subject either to proof or 
disproof. These we call axioms. Axioms are by definition 
self-evident, and it will be illuminating to ask what brand 
of self-evidence they have. Their self-evidence does not rest 
on demonstration. Geometers have sought in vain to demon-
strate the famous axiom of Euclid, that through a given point 
only one straight line can be drawn which is parallel to a 
given straight line. Finally, Lobachevski and Riemann found 
that they had better success in denying the various axioms, 
and from axioms based on these denials succeeded in estab-
lishing new geometries. But our confidence in the self-evi-
dence of axioms rests on another basis, which is the unex-
ceptional success with which they govern the very processes 
of thought and conduct. Are they only conventional, only 
useful, only 'descriptive short-hand,' as Pearson describes 
them? This is the confessed belief of a number of savants, 
including besides Pearson, Mach, Poincare, Ostwald, and 
Metchnikoff. But these views leave untouched the puzzle of 
how knowledge could guide us aright in a world of reality if 
this knowledge is not somehow true to that reality. We 
should have a far more complete theory of knowledge if we 
could show that the principles of science are not only useful 
but true. Is it possible to supply this deficiency? Can we 
hope to give to the principle of contradiction, as the classical 
type of all " useful " conventions, a richness of meaning and 
truth in addition to the 'usefulness' which everyone grants 
to it already? 
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To this end, we may avail ourselves of another observation 
of Poincare; namely, that such laws as the law of conserva-
tion, or the principle of least action are based on experi-
ences so omnipresent that they have escaped our notice. 9 
They are not subject to verification because they are the re-
sult of innumerable observations, so numerous that they have 
become unconscious. In other words, Poincare here says, 
that just to the degree that demonstration becomes perfect, 
it gradually ceases to be subject to verification. Like the 
ether, the air, and the rotation of the earth, it defies percep-
tion by its very omnipresence. Water, said Bergson, is the 
last thing that a deep-sea fish will ever discover. Now the 
principle of contradiction may be regarded as a habit of 
thought as ancient as life itself, and it escapes our discern-
ment because it is a part of that discernment itself. Back 
of habit there lies a necessity which drives it; and the more 
ancient the necessity, the more insensible to it will be the 
habit. 
Is it possible that the principle of contradiction has a vast 
richness of meaning buried under such deep strata that we 
miss all but the bare fossil which remains in the text-books 
of logic? We do indeed think so, and it is because this useful 
habit of thought is but the tool of a greater mind which 
wields it, that we employ psychological rather than logical 
analysis to arrive at its meaning. We do not aim to give it 
greater usefulness, but greater meaning. 
To begin with, the principle of contradiction presupposes 
the fact of memory on the part of the subject and employs it. 
Memory is indispensable in securing the self-identity of an 
object, for it is memory which preserves its antecedents for 
it. So far as the 'poor' objects are concerned, their changes 
are absolute, for they have no memory of their past locations, 
positions, and conformations. Atoms are transformed en-
tirely or not at all, and the pure space which they vacate 
leaves no lingering impress of their occupancy. But science 
9 Henri, Poincare, Science and Hypothesis, N. Y., 1905, Chap. 8. 
91 
50 The Concept of Duration 
considers the changes of objects as relative. Science is right, 
thanks to memory; for it is our remembrance of the past 
position of an object that enables us to restore that past 
position. It will be objected that this original position might 
be restored by chance, and in this case the intervention of 
memory is unnecessary. But it would be a chance without a 
calculus, since the number of positions in the totality of 
space is infinite. That is, the chance that mere physical 
states have of restoring themselves is infinitely small. But 
with the intervention of memory, we are able to speak of 
the relativity of change. Moreover, we are also able to speak 
of the essence or substance of objects. Formal logic does 
not explain our intuition that there is something about a 
thing which is not an accident or a property, and to explain 
this 'something' we turn metaphysicians. And as meta-
physicians, we call this ' something ' which persists through 
change substance or essence. Those logicians, therefore, who 
interpret the Aristotelian principle to mean the persistence 
of identity in the midst of change are going beyond their 
logic, or else they take logic and metaphysics to be the same 
thing. Properties may change but the substance of a thing 
persists, we say. But, outside of the light thrown on the 
problem of substance by memory, we can only say that sub-
stance is to be described by the predicate being, but this also 
describes everything else. 
But the role of memory in epistemology supplies another 
approach to the problem of ontology. It is memory that holds 
the power of restoring objects to their original form; and 
because of memory it is literally true to say that after ice 
has melted into water that a certain substance within it plays 
a positive role in restoring the properties of ice again. To 
be sure, we secure this relativity of change at the price of 
the absoluteness of time; for the time of memory itself is 
absolute in the sense that it occurs but once; and we shall see 
that the fact of time (in the sense of duration) cooperates 
with memory in giving meaning to the Aristotelian law. 
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30. The law of contradiction is often stated without any 
formal reference to time, but there is none the less an im-
plicit reference to it. In fact, we have seen that this prin-
ciple amounts to a positive assertion with regard to time: 
it definitely implies that change cannot occur without time. 
The law does not say that a can never be not-a; but only 
that it cannot become not-a without a passage of time. Now, 
what sort of time does this change to not-a require? Not 
mathematical time, because its moments do not prolong 
themselves into sequent moments. Sequent moments form a 
time in which memory cannot operate: and although a 
should be subject to millions of changes, it should never sus-
pect that it had changed at all. Nor could we know that it 
changed if mathematical time were the only time of experi-
ence. Mathematical time, like the line which is its emblem, 
is infinitely divisible, and at infinity, its instants will be 
instantaneous, that is, occupying no time at all. Its instants, 
like Zeno's ill-fated arrow, can never make progress. Thanks 
to the real time of memory, however, this steeple-chase of 
mstants is securely bridged. Time in the sense of duration 
will· divide, but only at the cost of great effort. Our power 
to divide a period of time into smaller parts is limited by 
attention. Our smallest instances are no larger than a single 
act of attention. The time of duration is also continuous, 
and the proof is, that the work of memory cannot otherwise 
be explained. To demonstrate this was the great work of 
Bergson in his Matter and Memory. Here we may confine 
ourselves to the most obvious proof of the continuity of 
memory. Memory does not store its various ideas as apples 
are stored in a basket. On the contrary, each idea that enters 
the memory act sas a leaven: all of the knowledge already 
there pecomes changed because of its presence, and it borrows 
from each element some of its native meaning. We add ideas 
to memory somewhat as we add grains of salt to a glass of 
water; soon the water is permeated through and through. 
We may exaporate the water and thus recover the salt in its 
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original form; but an idea which has mingled with a certain 
individual's memory can never again appear in its original 
form: the time of a memory is not repeatable, it occurs but 
once. Of course, it may be that the salt too bears somewhere 
within it an ine:ffacable record of its past; if so, this could 
only prove that the notion of mathematical time is a fiction, 
for physical objects as well as for living objects. 
31. A characteristic of memory which is just the opposite 
of what we have just now indicated is that memory can be 
unrolled in an auxiliary space, so that we can divide it into 
the past, present, and future. Does this perhaps indicate 
that memory-time is symbolized by the properties of a line? 
We may take C. A. Strong's convictions on this matter as 
the point of approach.10 Strong attacks the problem as to 
how the preservation of the past and the succession of the 
past, present, and future can be reconciled. The past and 
the future, he says, can only maintain their juxtaposition 
when divided by an indivisible instant "x.". But at such 
an instant, he rightly observes, time will cease to be real, 
"for the flight of time will be arrested." Strong proposes 
to meet the difficulty by the necessary conclusion that x, if 
it is to be real time at all, must be " awx "; that is, it is 
never so small "that all of its parts will be given at once." 
Yet, it tends to be an "infinitesimal change." That is, the 
transition from the past to the future is a succession " spun 
out infinitely fine." 11 In this case, the present is sharpened 
down to the point 0, and yet having a beginning and an end, 
since it is "spun out infinitely fine." Strong tries to meet 
this difficulty, of a present which is at once spanless, but 
which is still "spun out," with the notion of infinity. But 
this is of no avail, for the present will become spanless only 
at infinity; and when this occurs, it ceases to be " spun out." 
Finally, he meets this new difficulty by distinguishing between 
10 C. A. Strong, "Consciousness and Time," Phychol. Re1v., Vol. III, 
1896, pp. 149-157. 
11 Op. Cit., p. 152. 
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the time in which consciousness exists and the time of which 
it is aware.12 "The time that we are directly consciousness 
of it is not the real time that elapsed." The 'real' time; he 
says, is that of the point-instant, engaged in its infinite suc-
cessions from the past to the future. This is the time in 
which consciousness is. The time of which we are actually 
aware is given by the memory. The time in which the mind 
is only appears to us representatively.13 His representative 
time corresponds to what we have called mathematical time. 
Since he accepts this time as real, Strong is forced to deny 
reality to the time of memory. He concludes, "Our ap-
parently direct consciousness of the immediate past is an 
illusion," and " to take this illusion seriously is to be guilty 
of a sort of nalve realism in the field of time. Our con-
sciousness of even the nearest past must be ideal, not actual; 
representative, not intuitive." 14 
We have said that the principle of contradiction definitely 
implies that without the passage of time, change cannot take 
place. Strong does not deny this, but leaves us with the 
result that this passage of time is not real, but only concep-
tual. The reference to time by the principle of contradiction 
would therefore be only a useful convention. That time 
should be required for a to become not-a is due only to an 
ideal, a representative necessity. To sum up, the Aristotelian 
law requires the notion of time to give it meaning. That is, 
when it declares that a cannot at once be not-a, it positively 
declares that in order for a to become not-a the passage of 
time is required. We have sought to determine whether the 
notion of mathematical time is able to fulfill this need. We 
find that it is utterly unable to do so. For, in order to make 
the notion of a change from a to not-a possibl.e, a memory of 
the state a is necessary after the change to not-a has taken 
place. But this remembered persistence of the past, and the 
12 Op. Cit., p. 150. 
1a Op. Cit., p. 155. 
14 Op. Cit., p. 156. 
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continuous and irreversible time which it implies are them-
selves radical violations of the Aristotelian principle. Both 
of them declare the persistence of identity in spite of radical 
change. 
This situation presents alternatives. We may perhaps ad-
here to the Aristotelian principle as the only intelligible prin-
ciple in existence. But for this we must pay a price, and the 
price will be that the Aristotelian principle itself becomes an 
insoluble enigm.a; it will appear to be a principle which 
' works ' with unerring success in our real experience; and 
yet, it is theoretically suited to an artificial, ideal, and wholly 
conceptual experience, namely, the experience measured by 
mathematical time. The only world with which the Aris-
totelian law is in logical harmony, is the conceptual world 
of the text-books and the classroom. Here it enjoys that 
freedom from inconsistency which is the academic touch-
stone of truth. But in the sphere of action this principle 
presents a baffling contradiction, for it successfully solves 
the problems which arise in time in that it enables us to re-
store order and continuity to a world which alters its form 
from day to day because of the transforming effects of time. 
But, strange to say, it is this very transforming time that the 
Aristotelian principle cannot touch. 
There are two solutions for this difficulty. We may say, 
as Strong chooses to do, that the notion of this transforming 
time is itself an illusion. In this case, the real time for us, 
that is, a concept of time which obeys the Aristotelian prin-
ciple, will be a time " in " which we are, but it can never be 
a time of which we are " aware." The time of which we are 
"aware," that is, the continuom~ time of memory which 
carries within it its own past, is an illusion. What have we 
gained by accepting this alternative? We aimed to secure a 
monism of knowledge. That is, we sought to erect the Aris-
totelian principle as the sole principle of i,ntelligibility, ade-
quate to all problems. But for this monism of knowledge, 
we are forced to accept our universe as one in which the 
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principles that are successful, are yet never true; and in 
which the experiences of which we think we are "aware" 
(experiences of duration) turn out to be illusory. We are 
dualists in spite of ourselves. 
The other way out is to accept duration, the time of which 
we are " aware " as ontologically real. But in this case, we 
must acknowledge that it remains opaque to the Aristotelian 
principle. Its reality is vindicated by the fact of the inter-
penetration and yet mutual independence of the past, present, 
and future. Its reality is vindicated by the experience of 
memory which involves the persistence of identity in spite of 
change. The entire phenomenon of growth requires a prin-
ciple which is exactly the opposite of the Aristotelian law. 
Otherwise, we cannot bridge the gap between the oak tree 
and the acorn, or the gap in our pursuit of a host of minor 
purposes which together attain an end that is entirely dif-
ferent from any of them. Thus, if we are to make the whole 
of our experience intelligible, we are obliged to accept another 
principle of intelligibility which is quite the opposite of the 
principle of contradiction. Following the usage dictated in 
the passage cited above, let us call this other principle, which 
opposes itself to the principle of Aristotle, the principle of 
progress. 
Not the least of the grounds upon which we defend this 
principle is the fact that it is required in order to explain 
how the principle of contradiction can succeed. The Aris-
totelian law purports to be a law of change; but .there is no 
point whatever in speaking of change if these changes perish 
the instant after they occur. Change is a notion which gets 
intelligibility only because of the fact of memory which is 
somehow able at once to conserve the past and still represent 
it as having perished. Only memory and duration enable 
us to speak of the relativity of all changes of physical state, 
for it is the memory which enables us to restore past states. 
This alone saves change from being absolute. It is the rela-
tivity of change which enables science to adhere to its assump-
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tion that the universe is entirely conserved. The conserva-
tion of the universe means that time leaves no ineradicable 
impress on it; so that a given state of the universe or of its 
separate objects can occur more than once. The universe is 
conserved to the extent that its past states can be repeated: 
only in this sense can we say that it has lost nothing. But 
to repeat these past states presumes the reality of memory 
and the reality of human power. Thus, the principle of con-
tradiction does not require for its verification a demonstration 
in formal logic, for formal logic is itself based upon this 
principle; axioms and first principles do not explain them-
selves. The principle of Aristotle rests upon nothing else 
than the power which we as agents exert in the world of 
objects; it rests on the "experience of volition." 
32. We may therefore claim a certain logical priority for 
the principle of progress, since the Aristotelian principle 
presupposes it. We have rested this principle of progress 
on the experience of volition, and it will be instructive to 
enquire at more length what is implied by these terms. The 
Aristotelian principle rests on a certain principle of under-
standing, the principle of identity. Upon this foundation all 
of the processes of formal logic are based. The syllogism of 
formal logic is but a method of revealing to the mind of an-
other person identities already found. When the syllogism is 
once formed, thought has already taken flight. When the 
inventor of a syllogism presents it to another mind, that mind 
simply follows the movement of thought which the syllogism 
outlines, during which he too may attain or rather experience 
that sense of clarity which is the sign that a new identity 
has been attained. It is typical of the intellect that it rea-
sons from the known to the unknown by the simple device 
of finding identity after identity. It seems to be confined to 
description. On the other hand, we have another faculty of 
understanding which seeks to explain: it finds, not identities 
but causes. This manner of thought rests, not upon the prin-
ciple of identity, but upon the principle of causality, that is, 
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it is "' due to the experience of volition." Is it possible to 
establish the experience of volition as a unique source of 
knowledge? 
Hume derives and defends his scepticism on the theory 
that all knowledge is confined to sensations and ideas. His 
scepticism is the result of his refusal to recognize volition as 
a source of knowledge. Now, Descartes, Leibnitz, Berkeley, 
and Locke had undertaken to establish the existence of God 
on the causal argument, thus making of volition a valid 
source of knowledge. Hume refutes them with his well-
known contention that we can only know succession, not 
necessity; sequences, not consequences. There are relations 
between ideas but these relations are not causal relations. 
The notion of causality, he held, owes its origin to a feeling 
due to the constant conjunction of impression, that is, to 
custom. For example, we decide that fire is the cause of 
smoke, not because fire has some special inner potentiality, 
but simply because we always observe that fire precedes 
smoke. We are here at the crux of the problem of causality. 
Is there nothing more in the problem of volition than the 
observation of the succession of events? The issue Hume 
raises is really the question "Are men machines or are they 
not?" If Hume is right, then the terms causality and suc-
cession represent a distinction without a difference. That 
there is a difference the whole evolution of social, political, 
and religious life seems to indicate. Now, a mechanism has 
two outstanding characteristics: in its activity, the uni-
formity of succession of which Hume speaks is nearly per-
fect. The other great trait of the machine is its incapacity 
to profit from experience, that is, its incapacity to learn. On 
the other hand, in a living organism, these traits are reversed: 
the activities of the organism seem the farthest remove from 
uniformity, while its capacity to learn is very great. How-
ever, we think that it is impossible to show that the machine 
has monopolized uniformity of action, while the organism has 
monopolized the capacity to learn. No matter how unfore-
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seen the activity of the organism m.ay seem from an external 
study of it, it is still possible that the fortuity of its conduct 
is only seeming, and is due to our inability to discover the 
laws controlling it. The great success that biology and 
organic chemistry have had in discovering the " chemical 
mechanisms of conduct " lends support to this view. On the 
other hand, there is a sense in which we may speak of the 
' learning capacity: ' of material substance. The new machine 
performs its task better after some ' practice.' The violin 
fo the artist ' learns ' to respond to harmonious combinations 
of tones. There are many sympathizers with Hering's notion 
that memory is a general property of all matter. T. Brails-
ford Robertson 15 claims, on the basis of chemical demonstra-
tions, that memory is of the nature of an autocatalysis. 
Linseed oil, which has a fatty acid similar to one which can 
be demonstrated in the nervous tissue, seems to display this 
sort of 'memory.' It 'learns' to oxidize first more slowly, 
then more rapidly. If kept inactive it seems to forget how 
to oxidize, and its reactions become very slow. He even finds 
that the quantity of these changes follows Weber's law, and 
we thus get a hint that perhaps 'perception too is a similar 
process. Rignando 16 has pr_oposed an explanation of the 
learning process as due to electrical processes of the nervous 
system. The cells are · electrical accumulators, and the 
specific sensory processes leave in these cells a specific sub:-
stance which is added to those which are already there. 
Under the right conditions, these substances will again give 
rise to their characteristic currents, which accounts for the 
r~call of memory. 
Valuable as these researches may be for science, we must 
nevertheless insist that they neither prove nor disprove the 
existence of some vital entity which may be present in addi-
15 T. Brailsford Robertson, "Sur la Dynamique Chimique du Systeme 
Nerveux Centrale," Archiv. de Physiol., Vol. VI, 1908, p. 388. 
16 E. Rignando, Upon the Inheritance of Acquired Characters, Tr. by 
B. C. H. Harvey, 1911. 
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tion to the chemical processes described. We believe that 
mechanism and vitalism are but points of view so long as we 
bring to bear upon them, only the data of chemistry and 
physics. These are necessarily limited to the discovery of 
material states. But material states, like the atoms which 
compose them, may be infinitely refined. That is, no matter 
how minutely we trace the inter-locking of physical forces in 
the organism, we are still beset with the doubt, that if our 
analysis had only been more minute, we would have dis-
covered breaks of continuity and sources of indetermination 
in the protoplasm. But it will be objected that the scientific 
method is bound to find law-abiding• reality, however minute 
its researches. This amounts to saying that the scientific 
method is incapable of recognizing any sort of reality except 
that which is true to the principle of mechanical determinism. 
In this case, then, it is wholly inadequate to the problem, 
mechanism versus vitalism. Physical principles are of neces-
sity limited to the discovery of physical states. Hence, the 
absurdity of Laplace's rejection of God: because he searched 
the heavens with his telescope without being able to fiid Him. 
In the last analysis, we are only able to speak of the ' living' 
because of our inward experience of it. As Hoernle observed, 
a living body falls just as rapidly as a dead one: gravity finds 
no difference between them. 
33. However, though experimentation cannot tell us the 
difference between an organism and a chemical machine; 
introspection is fully able to do so. For, there is one aspect 
of inner experience which is our daily lot, and which possesses 
such realism that it leaves the hypothesis of mechanics futile 
when applied to the living. I refer to the experience of 
effort: of this the machine is incapable by its very definition. 
\Ve mean, that mechanical explanation owes its distinctiveness 
to nothing else than the elimination of the notion of effort. 
A volitional act possesses a unique character to which me-
chanical schematism is wholly inadequate. It is impossible 
t oimagine that the units of an interacting system exert 
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effort; o nthe contrary, each is completely yielded to its own 
'inertias. To be in space is to be of necessity subject to all 
of the enf arced movements of space. Every body follows the 
path of 'least resistance'; but even here we dramatize, for 
the ' least resistance ' is still some resistance. There is here 
an intrusion of our ineradicable belief that where there is 
motion there is life. 
Persisting in the mechanical mode of thought, let us ex-
amine changes of physical states. In doing so all we shall 
find will be other intermediate states, and so on to infinity. 
Thus, if we say that the cause of an event is a preceding state 
we are logically compelled to retraverse all such states to the 
very beginning of things. Because of this necessity J. S. 
Mill concluded that the universe is the cause of all things. Of 
course, this leaves us none the wiser concerning particular 
problems of causation that trouble us. Practically, we are 
forced to terminate this regress of states somewhere. We 
never look for all of the antecedent conditions of an event; 
but instead select a few that must serve by proxy for the 
whole universe. In the classic example of the cow that set a 
city on fire by kicking over a lantern:, we single out the cow 
and the lantern as the causes, and wholly ignore the city and 
the rest of the universe. Yet, logically, no fire could have 
occurred without these. Is this selection of causes then en-
tirely arbitrary? This is not at all the case, for in selecting 
the proximity of cows and lanterns as the cause of fires we 
are led to prevent such misfortunes in the future. We are 
unwilling to prevent fires by preventing the building of cities 
because the cities are worth the risk. What rule do we em-
ploy in selecting the 'right' cause out of that immensity of 
causes which Bosanquet calls the ' ground ' of the universe? 
Clearly, we designate that antecedent as cause which our 
human power can control. It is a volitional cause which 
terminates our search for the causal nexus of an event; and 
volitional acts are ever engaged in changing physical states, 
whether of the nervous system or of the world at large. It 
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is only mind that can cause and it is only mind that can be 
affected in any intelligible sense, so long as we insist that 
matter has only mechanical ·properties. For, so long as 
matter is true to mechanical principles it is only the path for 
the transmission of effects. This view obliges us to define a 
body as an eggregation of points where a multitude of forces 
intersect: the body itself neither terminates nor initiates 
anything. 
To be a cause in the psychological sense is far more than 
being an antecedent state. To cause is to labor, and to labor 
is to overcome resistance. Labor is the price of all creative 
effects. The God of the theologians is said to create worlds 
at the behest of thought. The perfection of this miracle is 
spoiled by the circumstance that thought too costs an effort. 
Moreover, like physical acts, an act of thought is paid without 
the assurance of victory. We have here the realism of life 
and the realism of chance. 
34. And with the reality of effort and risk, goes the reality 
of duration. True causation is not constituted by an align-
ment of physical states, but involves a creative development 
in time. Hence, the volitional, and consequently moral scep-
ticism of Hume and all others who seek to comprehend the 
nature of life and responsibility without admitting the reality 
of time in the sense of a duration. The timelessness of scien-
tific principles means no more than a certain deliverance 
from the fortuity of time to be obtained through their employ-
ment. This is in part key to the fact that science is the most 
formidable instrument in the hands of men. Our freedom 
becomes greater the more we are able to represent nature 
mechanically; but this is only because we "run the machine" 
as it were. Electricity becomes a human agency just to the 
extent that we are able to discover the ' invariable' prin-
ciples that govern its activity. We are able to prevent infec-
tious diseases just to the extent that we discover the fatalistic 
processes which underlie it. This ' invariable,' 'fatalistic,' 
and ' static ' property of scientific laws constitutes their 
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' timelessness.' and their ' timelessness ' is the symbol of their 
power to deliver us from the risks which the future conceals. 
That is, principles of science :foretell the future so accurately, 
that we are able to say that time does not exist for them. 
Their mathematical exactness is the badge of their useful-
ness. But the several natural sciences tend always to create 
ulterior difficulties for themselves by their very insistence 
that the formulae with which they garb nature are garments 
of nature's own choosing. The geometry of the classroom 
has all of the exactness which is required to make the intel-
lect ' feel at home.' But the intellect, not satisfied with the 
classroom, seeks to enforce its circles and triangles upon 
nature at large. But nature chooses otherwise, and she re-
fuses to supply us with a single triangle whose angles are 
actually in accordance with the intellect's specifications. 
Geometry requires that objects be perfectly rigid, otherwise, 
they cannot take on perfectly geometrical forms. But such 
bodies exist only as ideal possibilities, just as a perfect tri-
2.ngle has only an ideal existence. 
35. The experiences of choice, chance, and of effort, lead us 
unerringly, we believe, to a logic which is quite different from 
the logic of formulae: a logic which moves in a world of its 
own. The logic of causality testifies to a world of becoming 
just as faithfully as formal logic testifies to a world of being. 
We have suggested in some incidental paragraphs the manner 
in which these two ways of thought mutually imply and sup-
port each other. Here again we see them cooperating in 
presenting reality in a light that must often impress those 
who have acquaintance with the strife and· instability of ex-
istence: Soldiers on the battle front, toilers in the earth and 
on the trecherous sea. We mean the thought that the ex-
istence of the universe is just as possible as its non-existence. 
The intellect declares, "Being is forever guaranteed." But 
the logic of causality converts this into the resolve that being 
shall endure. Being hangs on the feeble thread of our loyalty 
and faith, and the intellect, too, depends upon this thread 
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when it declares the universe to be eternally conserved. You 
have ascribed to the intellect the function of guiding motive 
in its work of transforming reality. Formal lQgic and mathe-
matics are instrumental: they are ' unmoved-movers.' The 
relation between formal and moral logic is therefore a moving 
or dynamic relation. They seem destined to perpetual oppo-
sition to each other; and William James discerned the reason 
for this when he declared that the never-stopping clock which 
keeps metaphysics going is the conviction that the existence 
of the world is just as possible as its non-existence. 
3 
EXPERIENCE AS THE UNIFIER OF FORMAL AND 
MORAL REASONING 
36. Our heuristic use of the concept of teleology has been 
rather one-sided in this discussion; for we have almost con-
stantly employed it to throw into relief the differences be-
tween the formal and the caus,al mode of thought. This 
analysis has gone hand in hand with the distinction between 
value and fact. But in actual life, value and fact inhere in 
the same 'things,' and formal and causal reasoning are in-
dulged by the same ' self.' Without values, the formal 
opera,tions of the intellect would be stranded for want of a 
problem. Without intellect, all paths leading to the realiza-
tion of values would be blind ones. Impulse is not free with-
out reason to guide it; and the reasonableness of conduct as 
well as its freedom is made possible, as Milton and Dante 
discovered, by the rational choice of alternatives. 
We must then return to the world of particular objects 
and deeds, with their particular loci in time and space, to see 
how impulse and reason work out their mutual destiny. We 
shall see that here they play into each other's hands, as it 
were. Impulse, never pure, will harbor unawares the results 
of past reasoning. Reason, never quite succeeding in "loving 
truth for its own sake,'' will linger about those problems 
which value lends the spice of interest. Their dualism of 
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function again leads to that continuity of process which is 
8moothly and imperceptibly that the unreflective life o fcom-
mon-sense knows nothing of the contradiction between the in-
tellect which posits reality as static, and our moral sense 
which nevertheless always thinks in terms of transformation. 
It is indeed, as James said, as though we lived in two worlds, 
and that these worlds are equally possible. Our formal logical 
powers have developed to orient us to the world of being; 
and our moral sense adapts us to the world of becoming. 
But we have still to see how two modes of thinking, so diverse 
as these, are able to cooperate with each other. In our dis-
cussion we have so far contrasted them, perhaps too sharply, 
in the interests of analysis. We are now willing to say that 
this analysis, like most of the work of science and philosophy, 
substitutes artifice for reality. The formal and moral modes 
of thought are perhaps never exercised in pure isolation. 
They are but two opposing tensions of the same movement 
of thought. The form of thought which we normally ex-
ercise, whether philosophizing or not, is imagination; and 
imagination is that potent muse who weaves garments of 
intelligibility with which we clothe the many dark things of 
the world about us. Fact and value are but the warp and 
woof of these garments, and formal and moral reasoning are 
but the two hands with which the imagination weaves. The 
manner of this weaving is the theme which will next occupy 
our attention. 
IV 
TIME AS THE UNIFIER OF THE FORMAL AND MORAL 
ELEMENTS OF REASON 
1 
IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE AND REFLECTION 
37. There is a certain magic lamp, like that of Aladdin, by 
means of which we may cause certain chronic difficulties of 
thought to vanish. This lamp is the body, by means of whose 
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action the chasm which reflection finds between concepts and 
things is securely bridged. Immediate experience knows 
nothing of the stubborn problems that confront us when we 
philosophize about experiences. But immediate experience 
causes the problems of reflection to vanish without giving 
them a dialectical solution, which is what the philosophers 
require. Immediate experience is mute: is its silence that of 
wisdom or of ignorance? 
Our previous discussions have been in the main critical 
accounts of some of the ways in which immediate experience 
has been interpreted as knowledge. The philosophies of the 
schools desire to render immediate experience articulate, and 
especially to prove that their voice is its very own. Hegel 
would interpret all experience in terms of formal ideas. 
Schopenhauer saw in experience only the manifestation of 
blind will. Behaviorism contends that the richness of im-
mediate experience may be reduced to articulations of reflex 
arcs. Of common sense we had little to say, for common 
sense does not explicitly require immediate experience to 
have any intelligibility other than that which is constituted 
by our successful actions. Yet, common sense implicitly uses 
immediate experience as knowledge and it does so partic-
ularly with regard to the difficulty we have all the while 
emphasized: that of the opposition between fact and value, 
between being and becoming. We believe that there is an 
important thought neglected datum of experience which 
serves as the meeting ground for these apparently inimical 
concepts: that datum is the reality of effort." It mediates be-
tween our antitheticals as the principle of growth in the acorn 
mediates between the soil and the living oak tree. We do 
not propose, as did Condillac,1 to assume a statue, endow it 
with the sense of smell, and thereby secure ' from mere 
stone ' a complete soul. If but the statue have smell, the 
rest is comparatively easy. Condillac's assumption is typical 
of many bootless attempts to derive the living from the inert, 
1 Condillac, Traite des Sensations, Pt. 1, Chap. 11, Par. 6. 
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by surreptiously endowing the latter with a mite of sensi-
bility and then invoking ' evolution ' to complete its endow-
ment. The feeblest sentience of which we can conceive is 
already at an impassable distance from matter. Matter and 
life differ, not in degree, but in kind. Life, materialism tries 
to say, is " matter which has passed over and recognized 
itself." Here is the absurdity of every attempted monism: 
we set out to resolve mind to matter, but end by endowing 
matter with the very psychic properties we desire to banish. 
We should accept matter and experience as equally real and 
should attempt to compel immediate experience to yield us 
the mystery of their union. There is one experience in par-
ticular which should carry us far into the analysis of im-
mediate experience, perhaps to the very heart of it. That is 
imagination, which is at once a way of experiencing and a 
way of knowing. 
38. Imagination, we believe, is a generic type of experience 
in which we· are led at one extreme to literal contact with 
things, and at the other to literal contact with ideas. Im-
agination is to us a sort of thinking which must have been 
present at the first breath of life. It is the first articulation 
of experience. Indeed, our imagination is free from the keen 
sense of estrangement from reality which is typical of con-
ceptual thinking. There are numerous occasions when we 
are in a quandary as to whether our experience is real or 
fancied. Perhaps, if we look closely at the matter, we shall 
see that we move continually in a medium in which ideas 
hold commerce with things. Imagination is action grown 
somewhat abstract and symbolic, but is still so near to ex-
perience that it bears much of the character of deed. Out 
of primal imagination formal and moral reasoning have de-
veloped. The most essential property of imagination is 
creative inventiveness. Now, this creative inventiveness of 
imagination touches its own forms as well as everything else. 
For, imagination has its own principle of thought, as basic as 
are the principles of contradiction and of progress to reason 
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and will. This principle of the imaginative faculty is the 
principle of conceivability. 
What is the relation between the principle of conceivability 
and the principle of contradiction and the principle of prog-
ress? What is the relation of imagination to the formal and 
moral modes of thought? Finally, what inference does the 
nature of imagination lead us to draw regarding the onto-
logical character of the world in which imagination moves? 




39. The subject of imagination is somewhat neglected in 
current psychology. 2 Its discussion often appears as though 
incidentally under headings devoted to "thought," " repre-
sentation," "feeling," and "memory." Current separations 
of the imagination from reason are far from satisfactory; 
in most discussions of the subject we are either burdened 
with unworkable definitions, or else we fail to carry them 
through consistently. For instance, imagination is frequently 
spoken of as dealing with 'imaginary' objects, in contrast 
with reason as dealing with 'real' ones. We have indeed 
some occasion for holding that mathematics is even more 
successful with its imaginary entities. But it is not alone 
2 Coleman R. Griffith (General Introduction to Psychology, N. Y., 
1923) gives a single index reference to it which falls in a chapter on 
" Body-Mind " capacities in general. McDougall ( Outline of Psychol-
ogy, N. Y., 1923) treats imagination in a chapter ·on "anticipating" 
and "recollecting." W. B. Pillsbury (Fundamentals of Psychology, 
N. Y., 1916) discusses it with memory. This is also the case with E. B. 
Titchener (A Text-Book of Psychology, N. Y., 1913), and with H. C. 
Warren (Elements of Human Psychology, N. Y., 1922). Imagination 
is given a separate chapter by the following authors: R. S. Wood-
worth, (Psychology, N. Y., 1921); M. W. Calkins, (A First Book in 
Psychology, N. Y., 1919); by J. R. Angell, (Psychology, N. Y., 1908), 
and by James in his Principles, Vol. II. 
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careless usage that is to blame for the failure to keep im-
agination distinct from reasoning. The fact is that the 
nature of reasoning is such that reality and unreality must 
enter into all forms of it. There is no sharp line of separa-
tion between fact and inference. Accordingly, it is not per-
missible to assume that one sort of reasoning deals with the 
' real ' things and another sort with ' imaginary ' things. 
Again, it is frequently said 3 that the aim of imagination 
is to discover some new object, such as is involved in me-
chanical invention, while it is the purpose to discover rela-
tions between things which exist already. But was there ever 
a new object invented without a basis of real relations ob-
taining between things? And was there ever a relation dis-
covered which is not in some sense a ' new' relation? Or 
indeed a relation observed without at least some notion that 
the objects related play a part in the process? Actually, we 
cannot employ the external objects of thought as the basis 
for discriminating modes of thinking, because in every case 
the 'thing' thought is complex: It holds within itself some-
thing of interest for every possible note of comprehension. 
A ' thing ' is at once a unity and a multiplicity, a fact and a 
value, a form and a potentiality, a matter and an idea. Nor 
can we distinguish modes of° thought on the supposition that 
one discovers relations and the other the obj,ects related; for 
relations and the things related mutually imply each other. 
There is yet another way in which we may distinguish th~ 
work of imagination from the work of formal thought. We 
may say that the analogies and the resemblances with which 
the imagination deals are 'remote' while those involved in 
reasoning are 'exact.' But if we say only that the work of 
imagination is characterized by the looseness of its analogies 
we are simply saying that imagination is characterized by its 
proclivity for error. We must supplement this by saying 
that imagination is characterized also by potency in discover-
3 E. B. Titchener, "Thought," New Inte,rnational Encyclopedia,, 2nd 
ed., XXII, (1914), p. 249. 
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ing exact and minute resemblances. That is, imagination is 
a sort of thought where the maximum of exactness and inex-
actness mingle. In short, it is the lively realm of discovery, 
where bare conceivability is brought into touch with the 
world of the concrete. But this is to regard imagination and 
reason different only in degree. In this view, imagination 
is characterized by its fecundity, and reason is noted for 
rigid censorship over the work of imagination, rejecting such 
of its products as are not suited to reality. But there is yet 
another difference between reason (including both the formal 
and moral aspects of it) and imagination, one which is more 
than a difference of degree: we refer to the circumstance 
that the forms of reason deal either with facts or values 
taken alone, while imagination addresses itself to both at 
once. This is but to reiterate our former statement, that 
imagination is a form of thought which is as rich and com-
plex as experience itself. Experience and imagination are 
each acquainted with the antithesis of fact to value. Now, 
fact and value are both modes of thought and ontological 
traits of the world in which thought moves. Their opposi-
tion in thought points to a similar opposition at the very 
heart of things. And if thinking aims at the comprehension 
of reality then the duality of fact and value, 0£ what is and 
what ought to be, will never be lost to sight in any successful 
thinking whatsoever. It is this full reasoning, primary in 
both the logical and chronological sense, which we choose to 
call imagination. Imagination is the generic mode of thought 
which mediates between the world of being and the world of 
becoming. But, with the passing of time, imagination 
specializes its work, and gradually develops special ways of 
comprehending the antithesis between fact and value. Hence, 
formal and moral logic, special modes of dealing with facts 
and values respectively. These special forms of thinking 
have developed from imagination by a process of growth; 
but we believe that each bears within itself the reminiscence 
of the other, and that when they unite, we have primal im-
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agination, capable of dealing with a world sundered between 
that which is and that which ought to be. Formal and moral 
reasoning are only opposite tensions of the same movement 
of thought, and we shall see the proof of their genealogy in 
the fact (which we hope to establish) that when we deal 
with facts, values are implicit, and vice versa. 
40. To demonstrate that imagination resolves the antithesis 
between fact and value is a meaningless undertaking, unless 
we first describe the nature of this antithesis. 4 We have 
already described fact and value as different objects of 
thought and also as objects of different kinds of thinking. 
Nevertheless, the contrast between fact and value is a matter 
far easier to experience than to describe; and although we 
may assign contrasting properties to them, analysis shows 
that this procedure is somewhat artificial. In the end, we 
are forced to rest our distinction of fact and value on intui-
tion rather than on conceptualization, and our statement of 
the antithesis must accordingly be in the nature of a descrip-
tion of the two types of intuition involved. Intuition is not 
taken here in any cryptic or occult sense. By intuitive 
knowledge we mean that kowledge which is constituted by the 
direct experiencing of something; and it is a form of com-
prehension upon which· even the most a priori of concepts 
must depend for their claim to intelligibility. 
There is one point of contrast obtaining between fact and 
value which seems, to be sure, at once conceptual and in-
tuitive: this is their very duality itself. But of course this 
rlualism as such has no content outside of the intuition of it. 
That is, to achieve a conceptlal. contrast between fact and' 
value it is necessary to give a content to their dualism. But 
this procedure will never escape artificiality because fact and 
xalue are unstable as existents. For instance, we may 
enumerate the individual properties of gold and brass with 
i:tome certainty, because they are free from the effects of 
4 The concepts, fact and value are analyzed in Chapter III, division 
38, but their full opposition is best indicated by Chapter III as a whole. 
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time, at least, so far as all observational intents are con-
cerned. But fact and value represent, not only the properties 
within an object, but points of view in the subject who con-
templates and handles the object. Consequently, the same 
'thing' is subject to both formal and moral judgments. 
Logicians have long since observed the dual significance of 
the copula. To say that " snow is white " constitutes two 
judgments in one: the statement posits, not only that snow 
" is," but also that it " is white." We distinguish between 
the material substance of a thing and its qualities. The ex-
istential status of material substance, that is, of quantity, 
rests on the intuitive experience of its resistance to our wills. 
Snow exists for us when we discern that it blocks our progress 
or will block our progress if we invade it; just as a phantom 
is ' unreal ' because it does not resist us. But what of the 
existence of values? We are convinced of their existence be-
cause they attract us. Now, it is by the qualities of things 
that we are able to identify them as values. For instance, 
the qualitative properties of snow enable us to distinguish its 
potential values from that of other things which may never-
theless be quantitatively equal to it. Any given quantity is 
a value, but this is only when we gauge it by means of 
muscular effort in place of the balances. That is, a given 
quantity becomes a value by making a qualitative appeal (in 
this case, kinaesthetic) to us. Qualities are the symbols of 
value; and this holds for all the senses. Only those things 
which possess a significance for us are able to arouse qualita-
tive experience. 
It is because the apprehension of facts and values depend 
on experience of resistance and attraction that we are obliged 
to say that their distinctiveness can be verified only by an 
intuition. Only immediate experience can tell us what re-
sistance and attraction mean, and we could never reveal their 
distinctiveness to a person incapable of experiencing them. 
We may recognize in Plato's departure from the teaching of 
the Pythagoreans as an early recognition of the distinction 
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we here make between resistance and attraction. 5 The 
Pythagoreans had taught that things exist by "imitation" 
of numbers. These thinkers were interested in the quantita-
tive status of existent things. It is the mutual externality 
of things which leaves us only one resource when we wish 
to take quantitative account of them, and this is to say that 
they "imitate" each other. Indeed, the device of counting 
is a process based on this generic idea of the " imitation " 
of similars. On the other hand, Plato, very much alive to 
the reality of values and ideals, conceived that things exist 
by " " participation " in a form, and forms to Plato are ideal 
existences in the sense of ' ends.' The Pythagorean and the 
Platonic account represent two basic ways in which we appre-
hend the duality of our world: the world which resists us as 
against the world which attracts. 
But the world of experience is a world of particulars, and 
unfortunately for the ideal of 'system' in philosophy, we 
are unable to classify some things as ' facts,' only resisting 
us in the sense that the proverbial table of Thomas Reid re-
sisted him; and other things serving as ' values' in which we 
may participate in the Platonic sense. Thinghood, Aristotle 
reminds us, is always a compound of matter and form. This 
is to say that things are at once facts and values. They are 
facts in the multiform ways in which they are invariably 
presented to us. They are values to the extent that they 
promise to satisfy demand. But it is necessary to specify 
just what is implied by demand. A demand is always the 
requirement of something which lacks the existential charac-
teristic of facts. To be sure, three sides are ' necessary ' to 
a triangle, and six sides are necessary for a cube. But this 
sort of necessity is purely logical: it is not at all of the 
nature of a ' want ' such as we experience in moral matters. 
It is because of this that the axioms of formal logic appear 
as distinguished definitions. That is the formal sense that 
5 Aristotle, Metaphysics, tr. by J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross, The 
Works of Aristotle, Vol. VIII, Oxford, 1908, 987 b. 
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this defines the triangle. But the necessity which leads us 
actually to draw triangles is quite different: here for once 
is a kind of necessity which is more than a convention. It 
is the facination or the need of geometry, an ideal goal, 
which leads us to the self-imposed 'necessity' of studying 
Euclid. In short, things have value to the extent that they 
offer to fulfill certain wants. Things indeed form the battle-
ground where is waged the issue between being and becom-
ing; and the line of combat is determined by our standards 
of significance. 6 We choose the significances which are to be 
real for us, and in time, this choice delitnits our very world 
of perception for us. Our perceptual world, which constitutes 
the ' world of fact ' par excellence, rests on our interests: 
The world which we reject we will some day be unable even 
to see. 
It is this circumstance which justifies the inference which 
we have several times drawn regarding the ontological status 
of our world: being and non-being are equally possible. And 
this is why we are eventually led to acknowledge that the 
reality of facts and values rest on the " experience of voli-
tion " as truly as they do on the principle of resemblance. 
Tmagination is able to 'resolve' the antithesis between the 
logic of fact and the logic of value. But we must understand 
the term ' resolve ' in an unwonted sense. We do not mean 
that imagination resolves moral concepts to the concepts of 
formal logic. To achieve this sort of simplicity has been the 
futile hope of many philosophers. They forget that the dual-
ism of thought points to a dualism in reality: the reality of 
becoming cannot be banished by denying it on the conceptual 
level. But there is another kind of simplicity which imagina-
tion provides. It enables us to pass successfully from con-
cepts of value to concepts of fact; although this cannot b~ 
achieved without the expenditure of effort, the loss of time, 
and the risk of failure. Effort, time, and chance are the in-
6 H.B. Alexander, Nature and Human Nature, Chicago, 1923, p. 72. 
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exorable conditions which surround both thought and action; 
and this is only to repeat that our world is not given once for 
all, but is compounded of being and becoming. In imagination 
as in experience, the real and the fictive enter into the same 
drama; and it is this union which enables imagination to 
solve life's problems. To the intellect, in its unimaginative 
forms, this is incomprehensible. For the long and explicit 
acquaintance with material reality ·1eads this uncolored in-
tellect to say that the real and the fictive cannot "hang to-
gether." "Real coats cannot hang upon the ideas of pegs," 
it will say; it cannot see as does the moral reason (because 
of its acquaintance with purpose) that we learn to hang real 
coats upon real pegs only because we hang them there in 
thought first. Again, the intellect has been too vaunting in 
its self-assurance of familiarity with the real: it was 
through reasoning from formal principles alone, ignoring 
volition as a source of knowledge, that Berkeley and Hume 
arrived at a scepticism concerning the existence of the re-
putedly 'real' material world. Thanks to the striving 
motives of our moral nature, the precepts with which the in-
tellect is content are supplemented by action, and then 
scepticism is dispelled by the admission of new data, the data 
of volition. We must regard imagination as the archetype 
of all reasoning. Formal and moral reasoning are but its 
special forms. This is our thesis. Possibly as definition it 
does not possess the structural simplicity which the current 
logics r'equire. But our point is that the imagination must 
satisfy the requirements of life in general, and not merely 
the requirements of text or classroom alone. We suspect that 
the great virtue of structuralism is after all the rest that it 
gives to fatigued minds. The ledger of being and becoming 
for the imagination is never balanced; and in this its activ-
ities are like those of life, for we dwell in a world whose 
ledgers are never balanced. Everywhere in life it is plainly 
written that simplicity is not the essence of being, however 
convenient it may be thought. Formal simplicity is after all, 
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only relative; but there is another simplicity which success-
ful thinking absolutely requires, and that is simplicity of 
functioning. That is, thought must· be capable of that sim-
plicity of movement which leads the mind smoothly from 
the virtual world of memory to the real world of things, from 
the moral realms of values to the intellectual realm of facts, 
the moral realm of values to the intellectual realm of facts, 
from the discontinuous world of perception to the continuous 
world of deeds. This simplicity imagination possesses; and 
our central contention is that epistemology has involved itself 
in difficulties, not because it thought about things, but be-
cause it thought about thinking; and in so doing, it attempted 
to make one device of the imagination preempt the rest of 
them. We think that the arch example of this is the attempt 
to make reasoning by similarity the exclusive type of all rea-
soning. But to do this leaves us confronted with the dis-
heartening array of opacities which we have already enumer-
ated. 7 Our only hope of restoring consistency is by restoring 
imgaination to its own, capable not only of assimilating the 
unknown to the known on the basis of similarity but also of 
assimilating the known to the unknown in terms of causality. 
Let us see whether we can support our view by the facts. 
3 
FACT AND VALUE AND IMAGINATIVE THOUGHT 
41. Let us consider first the omnipresence of fact and 
value in imaginative thought. We may use here Spencer's 
principle that the final test of truth is the " inconceivability 
of the opposite." But the principle of inconceivability of the 
opposite is fraught with both virtues and dangers. It is a 
very basic rule of thought, and the Aristotelian principle of 
contradiction is but one side of it. The Aristotelian principle 
seizes one phase of it, and what we have termed the "prin-
ciple of progress" seizes the other. The law of contradiction 
7 Chapter III, Divisions 53 to 59. 
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declares, " This is a truth which we cannot but believe." 8 
The principle of progress replies, " Unless we can conceive 
the opposite." In imagination, these two principles are 
bound together in an ever-moving unity. Imagination at 
once creates and obeys this basic law of conceivability. Its 
task is to find the balance between discovering and making 
truth. The inconceivable is untrue, but only so long as it is 
inconceivable. Here we have both rigidity and flexibility at 
their height. A most illuminatihg example of its working is 
the thinking of the mathematician. His is a unique com-
hination of freedom and necessity. He may conceive with 
all freedom, but must adhere to his conceptions when once 
they are made and accepted. Thus, Riemann and Lobachevski 
created new geometries by arbitrarily denying the validity 
of the axioms which are basic to Euclid's system. It is by 
this dual freedom and necessity of procedure that the im-
agination carries on its work. Imagination is the experi-
mental method par excellence. It obeys a rule of thinking 
which is as rigid and as flexible as life itself, at once strong 
and yet changing in its devotions. Yet it is a principle which 
reveals to us a prime characteristic of the world in which 
thought moves. The fact that this manner of thinking ' suc-
ceeds ' (in any sense whatever) shows that the world is also 
compounded of being and becoming. The labor of conceiv-
ability is but the parallel in thought of the fact that we live 
in two worlds, a world of fact and a world of value. We 
mean, that the presence of this principle of conceivability at 
the root of all thinking points to an immutable condition of 
existence, namely, that existence and non-existence are both 
among the possibilities. 
In applying this test of conceivability, the imagination 
moves from the temporary rest which is called fact to that 
temporary strife which is called inference. The great danger 
consists in resting with a given horde of facts forever, as 
s Durant Drake, "The Approach to Critical Realism," Essays in 
Critical Realisrn, 1920, London. 
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some of those do who take for their measure the law of con-
tradiction without its complement. Franklin, Arago, Galileo, 
Copernicus, and Bruno could testify that the principle of 
inconceivability of the opposite will find treacherous uses 
unless we have a certain humility without which we should 
not enter the kingdom of science. That we " cannot _conceive 
of the opposite " does not prove that others cannot do so. 
Current psychology affords numberless instances of the de-
nial of entities which the intellect is unable to comprehend. 
The soul is a myth since no ' structural components ' can be 
found for it: this illustrates the tendency of the intellect to 
deny what is cannot comprehend. There are truths which, 
though they depend on experience, are yet independent of its 
amount. Even the validity of a classification in formal logic 
does not depend on the exaustive enumeration of the cases it 
subsumes. 
Mankind is forever pioneering in the universe of thought, 
and the successful pioneer at once trusts and distrusts his 
own conceptions. Over our thinking hangs an ominous 
fortuity, and nowhere is the struggle for existence wager so 
relentlessly as in the world of thought. As Plato discerned, 
the conflict of ideas is the motif of all history, human and 
animal. There is indeed a dialectic of thought, but its neces-
1:1ity is imposed by the world in which we dwell. How does 
this necessity appear in the technique of verbal dialectic? 
38. In verbal discourse we employ " terms " as emblems of 
meaning; and " terms " when their meanings are analyzed, 
turn out to be but the place-names of their temporary rest. 
Here the desire for eternal rest which besets our flagging 
energies, emerges in the attempt to make one term preempt 
the meaning of its opposite. Thus, La Mettrie would fain 
have the term machine include all organism; and Hegelianism 
would make the machine an idea, and Watson would regard 
the idea as a vocalization. The test of success in these at-
tempts is to ask whether our terms are not fraught with 
double meaning. For example, we should ask what profits 
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it to speak of a machine which 'thinks,' of an 'idea' which 
tips the balances, and of a chemical process in the vocal 
organs which ' comprehends its own formula.' In all of 
such cases we obviously try to make an identity of meanings 
which are radically different. 
On similar grounds, we argue that fact and value are terms 
pointing to utterly different meanings. We cannot, there-
fore, apply to them the same term. We must be simple in 
our terminology but only so simple as we dare to be. The 
grim difference between the world that is and the world that 
ought to be, is as yet such that it is beyond comprehension 
to identify them. Logic has a method of testing the validity 
of inferences, but none for the intelligibility of words. We 
define words by reference to others; always we are made to 
understand by something which is not defined. This is be-
cause underneath the inert symbolism of words there is a per-
petual evolution of meaning, which words only approximate, 
as a zootrope affords but an approximate image of the move-
ments of a dancer. Definition .is, accordingly, an art, half 
guided by rule, half guided by intuition. Pascal advised us 
to define neither too much nor too little. This all comes to 
saying that the dialectic of terms is but the surface expression 
of the deft yet unforeseeable dialectic of the imagination. 
The concepts employed in lo,gic are meanings just structural 
enough to be fixed by a word; 9 but an idea is more than a 
structure: it is an individual subject to growth or to decay. 
42. Let us consider in more detail what is given and ,what is 
made in this world in which imagination moves. The Aris-
totelian principle of contradiction is that a thing remains 
what it is. Red is red: its principle of action upon and our 
action upon it remain constant. Yet, if we had this and no 
more, we should be living in a non-moral world. That is, if 
seeing grar forever precluded the seeing of red and green, 
and if this were the same for everything else, then fact and 
value would be identical, and thought would have no excuse 
0 John Dewey, How We Think, 1910, p. 125. 
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for existing, because there would be no invention which it 
could achieve. But Aristotle's principle indicates only one 
side of the thinking process. Even while we say that a thing 
will not change, we endeavor to change it. That is, we ap-
prehend the ' thing ' by a sort of effort, which it constantly 
tries to evade. The " fixity " of a thing includes our effort 
to hold it "fixed." Moreover, even while we say that the 
thing is fixed we prepare to change it, and our success in 
doing so is a story which we call evolution. To amplify, 
common-sense implicitly takes sense-data as present in the 
objects to which they refer. Neo-realism, seeking to make 
this into explicit theory, must undertake the difficult task of 
showing that incompatible sense-data can characterize the 
same object at the same time. Says Mr. Percy Nunn,1° "A 
hot body owns at the same time all the hotness that can be 
experienced around it." "The buttercup actually owns-
' as co-ordinate substantive features '-all of the colors that 
may be present under different conditions." Holt declares 
that the whole world is full of such contradictions.11 Granting 
that the iron will 'own' heat at all (which is already at the 
opposite pole from neo-realism) it could own no more than 
one temperature since it has but one position with respect 
to itself. The buttercup might well ' own ' (in its own 
memory, let us say, if it have one) "all the colours which 
may be present under different conditions "; the different 
'conditions' referred to will be real because time is real. 
That is, even the buttercup must distinguish between the 
color it does have and the many other ones which it might 
have. In vain do we try to erect a monism of being or a 
monism of understanding. Neo-realism cannot (and they 
do not attempt it) demonstrate that the monism of being 
which they defend is either physical or mental. 
10 Percy Nunn, Proc. Aristotelian Soc., (N. S.) Vol. X, pp. 197, 203. 
See also S. Alexander, Ibid., Vol. X, p. xi. 
11 Edwin B. Holt, The New Realism, pp. 364, 370. See also his The 
Concept of Consciousness, Chap. XIII. 
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Bertrand Russell essays an escape from the difficulty 
arising from the fact that different individuals find different 
sense-data in the same object.12 He maintains that there are 
an infinite number of worlds, each of which has a space of 
its own. There are as many of these spaces as there are 
private percipients; therefore the qualities which pertain to 
any one space cannot clash with the qualities found in the 
other spaces. But if the perspective, that is, the space, of 
each percipient is completely removed from all other spaces, 
then no problem arises which needs to be solved by Russell's 
subtlety. He first assumes that only one perspective enters 
into one awareness, but then assumes this to be somehow 
disturbed by the necessity of reconciling what it finds with 
the sense-data that belong in other spaces. Difficulty only 
arises when we have two subjects, entertaining the same per-
spective, who yet find a difference of sense quality in the 
same thing. How is this difficulty to be solved? We think 
that it can never be solved so long as we suppose that the 
sense qualities belong to the object and to the subject alone. 
The way out is to make use of the fact that these sense-data 
are in a sense given to the object by the subject-they repre-
sent a certain efficiency which we have acquired in encounter-
ing objects. If the normal eye sees red where the color-blind 
eye sees gray, there is here no problem of logic, no. problem 
as to how incompatiable sense-data can adhere in the same 
object. We are here only concerned with a problem of 
defect. The eye which sees gray suffers from an insufficirmcy 
of vision. The dictum " red remains red " only means, there-
fore, " red remains red until we are able to make it yield 
some other sensation." Thus, even perception follows the 
principle of conceivability; and it is this which keeps vision, 
for example, forever different from photography. It is im-
agination which lends its characteristic properties to all living 
activities, making of the whole phenomena of growth a unique 
prcoess which can never be fully explained in chemical terms 
12 Bertrand Russell, Scientific Method in Philosophy, Chicago, 1914. 
122 
Christian O. Weber 81 
so long as chemistry is a science of fixed entities. If we 
mount from the sphere of perception to the sphere of memory, 
we shall find that imagination exercises its influence in such 
a way that it makes memory far more than the 'wax-tablet' 
theory can describe. 
43. The problem of memory is to understand how its 
images can at once denote an object and connote a meaning. 
Many psychologists have made attempts to show that some 
images are copies of objects and others embodiments of mean-
ing. Some among them have insisted that thought and the 
meanings which it involves must be imageless. The debate 
concerning imageless thought is one of the most extended and 
significant debates in which modern psychology has been in-
volved. To this problem our discussion has led, and in deal-
ing with it we will make use of a valuable summary by 
Francis A veling.13 
Galton 14 was the author of the notion that images were 
often like composite portraits, and this ingenious notion 
attracted the attention of Huxley, Hume, and Binet. Galton 
studied the mental content when one thinks of particular and 
general terms. He found some observers who testified that 
they found nothing in consciousness except the word itself15 
Ribot, however, was the first to offer any considerable study 
of imagery.16 He sought to discover what is in the mind 
when we get a general term through some sense mode. Such 
terms were presented to observers, who were asked to give 
their introspections. Their replies were classified. Thus, he 
arrived at a confirmation of the notion of 'types of imagery.' 
13 Francis Aveling, On the Conscwusness of the Universal and the 
Particular, 1912. This volume also contains a history of the concepts 
of the universal and the particular in philosophy, and contains a report 
of an experimental study made by the author, the chief result of which 
is to demonstrate that meaning is not dependent upon imagery. 
14 Sir F. Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty, 1883. 
15 Sir Francis Galton, Op. Cit., Appendix E. 
16 Th. Ribot, " Enquete sur les Idees Generales," Revue Philosophique, 
1891, Vol. 32. See also his L'Evolutwn des Idees Generales, 1897. 
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But some of his observers found nothing else in consciousness 
except the word. Ribot argued that there must be something 
else in the mind besides the word, else the word would be 
meaningless. He concluded that a ' general idea ' is a word 
plus possible imagery plus an obscure unconscious element 
which he does not define. This, it may be observed, is a 
rather spectaculative vein for one so given to 'positivism ' 
as was Ribot. But we appreciate the difficulty he was under. 
The truth is, we are here engaged with a difficulty which is 
as much logical as it is experimental. There is the same 
distinction between an image and its meaning that there is 
between anything and its meaning. The attempt to identify 
imagery and meaning is doomed to failure at the very start. 
Marbe's work is important.17 His study of judgment ended 
with the conclusion that judgment is a fact that we are aware 
of in its own character, not at all as a sensation, not as an 
image, nor as a feeling. It possesses imageless content 
(Bewusstseinslagen) involving attitudes of consciousness that 
are different from perceptions and images. Ach 18 carried 
out experiments in the study of will and thought and finds 
that his observers report content or knowledge for which there 
is no qualitative basis. But he holds that the tendency to 
arouse these when an idea is in the mind accounts for the 
experience of meaning. This notion is similar to James' 
theory of the ' fringe of consciousness.' Watt 19 confirmed 
the observations of Kiilpe that the task set for the observer 
chiefly affects the nature of his apperceptions; and he con-
cludes also that there are indefinite images that may function 
as ' universals,' though he points out that this does not pre-
clude the existence of non-imaginal or general ideas. 
17 Francis Aveling, Op. Cit., p. 61. Cf. K. Marbe, Experimentell-
psychologische Untersuchunge,n iiber das Urteil, Laipzig, 1901. 
18 Loe. Cit., p. 61, Cf. N. Ach, Uber die Willenstatigkeit des Denken, 
Gottingen, 1905. 
19 Loe. Cit., p. 65. Cf. Watt, H.J., "Experimentelle Beitriige zu einer 
Theorie des Denkens," Arch. f. die ges. Psychologie, Vol. IV, 1905, p. 289. 
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Messer,20 basing his researches upon those of Watt, finds a 
'general image.' It is so ill defined that it can stand for a 
whole class. But he does not by any means consider either 
a particular or a general image as the necessary condition 
of understanding. He finds that when a key is given to a 
subject, the meaning frequently appears in consciousness 
before the word. The work of Buhler 21 on the thought-pro-
cesses as a whole ends with the conclusion that thought is 
mediated by concepts, not by images. His defense of image-
less thought is clear and uncompromising. Bovet repeated 
the experiments of Marbe, Messer, and Buhler in Geneva in 
1908,22 and defends the general method of research used, and 
corroborate their conclusions. 
But these Wurzburg psychologists are severely criticised 
by Wundt 23 and by Titchener.24 Von Aster joins them in 
their general condemnation of the doctrine of imageless 
thought; which is that such thought is beyond ' observation,' 
and amounts to an indescribable experience. 
Newer studies, however, reaffirm their findings. Moore 25 
made a study of abstraction, and among other results, con-
firms the existence of imageless mental contents. Perception, 
he concludes, is made possible by the existence of mental cate-
gories to which sense experiences are assimilated. So we 
20 Loe. Cit., p. 67. Cf. A. Messer, "Experimentell-psychologische 
Untersuchungen iiber des Denken," Archiv. f. die ges. Psychologie, Vol. 
VIII, 1906, p. 1. 
21 Loe. Cit., pp. 68-69. Cf. Buhler, "Tatsachen und Probleme zu einer 
psychologie der denkvorgange," Archiv. f. die ges. Psychologie, Vol. 
VIII, 1907, p. 297; also Vol. XII, 1908, p. 1. 
22 Loe. Cit., pp. 68-69. Cf. P. Bovet, " L'Etude experimentale du 
Jugement et de la Pensee," Archives de Psychologie, Vol. VIII, 1908, 
p. 9. 
23 Loe. Cit., p. 69. Cf. Wundt, Psychologische Studien, Vol. III, 1907, 
p. 301. 
24 Titchener, E. B., Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the 
Thought Processes, N. Y., 1909. 
25 Moore, "The Process of Abstraction," Univ. of California. Publica-
tions, Berkeley, Cal., 1910. 
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find this problem of meaning and imagery entering into the 
present concerns of psychology but without being solved. 26 
44. We have learned that this problem of imageless mean-
ing is ill suited to investigation. Images are prone to appear 
when we seek them, and we are left in doubt as to whether 
they are ever absent when we think. Let us see. whether 
this problem is not more than an experimental one. Let us 
suppose for the sake of argument that we never think with-
out the presence of images. Would this fact in any way 
account for the notion of generality and of meaning? We 
think not. The difficulty is that the image is supposed to be 
the copy of a particular object at the very start. 
Now, it is possible to derive meaning or generality from 
these particular images in one of two ways. First, the image 
becomes the symbol or bearer of generality. In this case, the 
image itself is not the meaning. What then is the unknown 
which we call meaning, and why does it choose a particular 
image to bear it? The whole problem of the relation between 
mind and things is transferred to the mental realm ~here it 
becomes the problem of the relation between meaning and 
imagery. 
45. The second solution affirms that certain images as such 
are general meanings. Their generality is like that of com-
posite portraiture of which Galton speaks. The difficulty is that 
the portrait and the 'faded image' taken alone do not reveal 
their generality. The portrait might be the very likeness of 
some person, none need guess that it is a photograph of 
society at large. How then shall we know which images are 
the general ones? Is it when we use them as generalities? 
1f so, then the image does not give generality to us, but we 
give generality to it. Another device is to say that general 
images are somewhat faded ones, in which particular fea-
26 Our review of the literature is only a sketch of the chief results. 
To be even a survey, we could not ig,nore the work of Egger, Bain, 
~trickler, Stiimpf, Paulhan, Baldwin, Bastian, Collins, Lehmann, Secor, 
.. 11d others. 
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tures have dropped out. But in this case, instead of regard-
ing the image as a lordly generality, why do we not consider 
it as even less than an individual, perhaps a:s a ghost or an 
illusion? 
We seem to be struggling here, not with an experimental 
difficulty, but with a logical one. We have already accepted 
an image as denoting a particular thing and nothing more. 
Is it not then rather vain to try to extort from it meaning 
and generality which we have already by definition excluded? 
We must reconsider our first presumptions regarding the 
image. If we begin by declaring that the image is no more 
than an 'imitation' of an object, we are still wrong in in-
ferring that therefore an image is no more than a denotation. 
In any case, if we accept it as purely denotative, it is futile 
to try to extract connotation (meaning) from it. Images 
are 'imitations' of objects in some sense, but we must remind 
ourselves that objects have a double significance: they are 
at once facts and values. The object is the meeting place of 
the general and the particular, for fact and value. To state 
this same view ontologically, the ' thing ' is the meeting place 
for being and for becoming. And if it is the work of per-
ception to portray ' things ' in all their truth, then we will 
expect that images, derived from sense, will do the same. 
The image too is the meeting place for fact and value, for 
particularitly and generality; and the problem here is no 
more obscure than it is with the object itself. It is perception 
which mediates between ' things ' and the images of them. 
Let us consider the phenomena of perception in more detail 
in order to untangle the devices by means of which it appre-
hends at once the generality and particularity of things. 
The resemblance of the eye to a camera (made evident by 
the classic work of Helmholtz) has led to the stubborn and 
persistent notion that vision is· a sort of photography. But 
in our opinion, vision, and every other sense process, ex-
hibit characteristics which go far beyond what chemical pro-
cess is able to explain. In perception there is a vital labor 
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which has not a few analogies to thinking. Perception is a 
process in which the discovery of resemblances and differences 
go hand in hand. If we suppose that perception grasps only 
the particulars, we find ourselves involved in both logical and 
experimental difficulties. If perception grasps only ele-
mentary sensations we make it unable to testify as to the 
reality of what it perceives. Titchener demonstrated this-
though not by intention. He attempted to apply to perception 
his usual method of analysis, of reducing all phenomena to 
their elementary ' components ' or elements. He analyzed 
the sensations into attributes of quality, intensity, duration, 
clearness, etc. How, then, do these various properties yet 
belong to one and the same sensation? Because qu,ality 
serves the office of an essence, giving modality to all sensa-
tions and serving as a sort of matrix in which the other 
properties can adhere. Thus, a sensation becomes an ele-
ment, and its attributes are 'aspects' or 'sides ' of it.2• 
Titchener arbitrarily takes quality as something more than 
an 'aspect' of the sensation. To have taken intensity in its 
place would have been just as tenable logically. 28 But 
Titchener argued that quality serves his purpose best since 
it keeps down the number of sensations and their kind. The 
substance of a sensation thus turns out to be only an arbitrary 
determination, selected because of its systematizing value. 
In fact, the 'elementary sensation' itself turns out to be an 
entirely subjective concept. It was by similar argument that 
Berkeley and Hume arrived at scepticism regarding the 
extra-mental existence of things. This criticism has been 
urged by Rahn and others. Rahn pointed out that intensity, 
27 E. B. Titchener, "Sensation and Its Attributes," Lecture 1 of his 
The Psychology of Feeling and Attention, 1908. 
28 C. Rahn, " The Relation of Sensation to Other Categories of Con-
temporary Psychology: A Study in the Psychology of Thinking," 
Psychol. Rev. Mono. Suppl., Vol. XVI, 1913, No. 67. Other critics are 
Miss Calkins, Psy. Rev., Vol. VI, 1899, No. 5. Ladd and Woodworth, 
Elements of Phy.siological Psychology, 1911, p. 302. 
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duration, and clearness are relative and therefore necessarily 
subjective. They depend on comparison. Titchener refuses 
to make a thorough reply to Rahn 29 because Rahn refers to 
no works of his later than 1910. Titchener further explains 
that he distinguishes between the ' sensation of classification ' 
and the 'sensation of observation.' The 'sensation of classi-
fication ' is the type in which he interests himself as an ex-
perimentalist. The various attributes of the experienced 
sensation that are found together in experience are 'brack-
eted' together by the experimenter. But how do we know 
that they belong to one and the same thing externally? 
Titchener admits that we are able to bracket together only 
what we find together in the excitation, and he thus gives ex-
citation the logical preference over ' determination.' We 
accept this result, but point out that it amounts to an ad-
mission on the part of Titchener that our faith in the exist-
ential status of a sensation is verified by immediate experience 
only. We have failed to establish the reality of a sensation 
by an abstract association of ' components.' 
Perception is then this mutual discovery of unity and 
multiplicity. Says Bergson,30 "Generalization can only be 
effected by extracting common qualities; but that qualities 
should appear common, they must have already been subjected 
to a process of generalization.'' Perception is just such a 
simultaneous process of association and dissociation. Percep-
tion seems passive, but it is really an active process-it in-
volves wMk ... We ' carve ' the things we see out of a confused 
world. Otherwise, how could the repetition of a perception 
make it clearer? Is it because a second occurrence deepens 
the impress on the brain? Then, how is memory able to 
separate the two impressions made in the same place, since 
it is able to recall each occurrence separately? It appears 
that these various impressions are at once added and kept 
29 E. B. Titchener, "Sensation and System," Am. J. of Psychol., Vol. 
XXVI, 1915, No. 2, pp. 258-267. 
30 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, 1911, p. 205. 
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separate; and this fact serves to demonstrate that memory 
is such that the notion of a wax-tablet explains only one-half 
of what memory does; and the same holds true of perception. 
Perception and memory are both instruments of the imagina-
tion, and it is this fact which renders chemical explanations 
of them forever inadequate. Chemical and physical explana~ 
tions cannot touch the world of becoming in which imagina-
tion (and with it, memory and perception) moves. Percep-
tion and memory, like imagination, are a kind of thought, as 
their role in thinking makes apparent. 
46. So far, our description of 'how' the imagination has 
divided itself into two distinct functions goes somewhat in a 
circle. We say that the imagination has two tasks because 
we live ii:t two worlds which oppose each other, the world of 
ideals and the world of facts. Our account further holds that 
the imagination, and the action which realizes it, causes these 
two worlds to telescope enabling us to go from the one to the 
other. This assumption of the duality of our experience is 
no gratis dictum of ours. That we dwell in a world of being 
as distinguished from a world of becoming is a truth forced 
upon us by experience. So much is this the case that we 
regard a person who makes no distinction between fact and 
value, either in thought or in act, as defective. · But there is 
another matter which is more open to debate, and this is the 
question as to how such a double reality can appear to the 
same subject. We have tried to make this clear in our 
definition of the imagination and its description; and we have 
also tried to show how imagination specializes its processes 
without sacrificing its generality of power. We have still a 
further difficulty. Just how does imagination gain something 
and yet lose nothing by its characteristic fission into formal 
and moral modes of thought? How is thought able to solve 
problems more efficiently than action? 
If in thinking we merely play the drama of life subject-
ively with only ' copies ' of the particulars with which we 
deal in active conduct, it is difficult to see how any advantage 
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is possible. This theory of reasoning goes back to associa-
tionism and was defended not only by the associonist logicians, 
but by such psychologists as Bain, Hartley, and Binet. Will 
it be argued that by dealing with images instead of real ob-
jects, we are able to avoid the fatal 'trial and error' which 
is met with in conduct? But it is quite certain that these 
images are less exact than their originals ; and in this case 
it would seem that the ' trial and error ' difficulties were only 
aggravated when we choose to think rather than to act. To 
be sure, such errors will be confined to thought; but thought 
must issue in action sooner or later, and then the accuracy 
of action will be no greater than the accuracy of thought 
which preformed it. Indeed, if thought proceeds only by the 
association of images, it has less chance of succeeding than 
have the sensori-motor arcs which we assume to govern action, 
since the latter are supposed to ' deal ' with the real and un-
mistakable original objects, with few risks of the errors 
which creep into the images of them. 
Is thought less subject to error because it can repeat its 
trials ad libitum before venturing to act upon them? This 
could only be provided the trials were varied for the purpose 
of determining the more successful ones. But, it is impos-
sible to say which is successful until all are tested in experi-
ence. What is more, if each virtual trial occurs with all the 
particular details that the reality will involve, there must be 
included the same loss of time and the same effort as in real 
experience, since time and effort too are details of a lived 
event. In truth, such thinking would have nothing to dis-
tinguish it from action itself. Thought can hardly be said 
to involve either less or more effort than action, because they 
are to a great extent efforts of a different kind. At any rate, 
there is no measure of effort except the testimony of men-
and it appears that most men prefer action to.reflection. 
In what, then, does the peculiar advantage of thinking 
consist? Is the efficacy of thought due to its utilization of 
memory? But action too has its 'memory,' if we mean 
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memory of the wax-tablet variety. Tropisms, reflexes, habits, 
and instincts are all organic ' memories,' and seem to be both 
general and particular, just as the conscious memory seems 
to store bot hgeneral and particular ideas. For example, the 
heart reflex is particular; it suffices for one particular task 
alone. The biceps reflex has a generality which suits it to 
countless functions. But we do not regard such functions as 
thought. Actually, the beceps reflex is as particular as that 
of the heart, it is only to the mind which sees its multiform 
uses that its action is generalized. We have rejected the 
notion that thinking consists in the association of particulars. 
Neither does the unique power of thought consist in its sole 
use of general ideas. For one thing, generalities are notably 
incapable of informing us · adequately concerning our prob-
lems, which are always particular ones. The law of gravity 
does not tell us when a given apple will fall: there is an 
element of fortuity in every event, which is fortuitious for 
the very reason that it has not (perhaps cannot) be 
generalized. 
If thought is to be successful, it must be both general and 
particular at once. To achieve this is the typical work of 
the imagination. It makes possible the development of 
special structures and functions without sacrificing the 
generality of possible development. Imagination has de-
veloped formal and moral reasoning as special processes, but 
it has done so without permitting either one entirely to lose 
the power of the other. Imagination, while it divides things 
into numbered parts, retains the general value which binds 
them into a common class. This mutual exercise of generali-
zation and particularization is characteristic even of the 
lowest forms of thought. 
47. No doubt imagery plays a large part in the thinking of 
savages and in the thinking of children.31 But the use of 
particular images does not prove that untutored minds are 
s1 Levy-Bruhl, Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Societes lnferieures, 
1910. 
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capable only of particulah ideas. On the contrary, there is 
good reason to think that such a mind employs particular 
images partly as symbols for adstractions. The thought of 
the scientist differs from this only in degree. He displays a 
tendency to greater and greater abstraction, but at the same 
time to greater and greater particularity. It is just to the 
extent that we can bring some past generality of experience 
to bear upon a particular object or event that we are set 
free from the fortuity of time. Accordingly, the more ab-
f-tract thinking of the scientist gradually loses the dramatic 
and timeful quality of the thinking of the child. Experience 
comes more and more to be represented by timeless concepts; 
but to the extent that thought is inventive, this timefulness 
is not eliminated but only obscured. Thinking, like life in 
general, is under two necessities: the necessity of being 
efficient, and the necessity of being plastic and invetive. Evo-
lution an dimagination are both under the · necessity of dis-
charging these two functions. Evolution so resembles im-
agination in this respect that we suspect that evolution is the 
characteristic product of imaginatinve thought. The Spen-
cerian notion of evolution as a progression from the general 
to the ·special is utterly untenable. If generality were ex-
hausted, evolution would of necessity come to an end. When 
an animal's entire powers are represented by specialized 
structures, it has attained, to be sure, ' perfect ' adaptation 
to a given situation; but at the same time its powers to adapt 
itself to a new situation: (which is what evolution means) 
reaches zero. The problem of evolving is the problem of find-
ing the golden mean, the best balance between particularity 
of adaptation and generality of power. To maintain both ofl 
these functions is the characteristic function of the imagina-
tion. It is our aim to show that in all stages of thought, 
whether it ·be the thought of the savage, of the scientist, o:r: 
of the poet, induction and deduction, association and disso-
ciation, judgments of fact and judgments of value mutually 
support each other. 
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Primitive imagination is mainly reasoning by analogy. In 
it there seems to be nothing of the elaborate induction and 
deduction of the scholar. "A child sees in the moon and stars 
a mother surrounded by her daughters. The aborigines of 
Australia called a book a ' mussel,' merely because it opens 
and closes like the valves of a shell-fish." 32 But do these cases 
involve reasoning by resemblance alone? We think not, for 
there must be present also an active dissociation which leads 
to the overlooking of the discrepancies. On the other hand, 
there are instances of primitive thinking in which resemb-
lances are suppressed, as when a savage recognizes an indi-
vidual tribesman by suppressing the resemblances he bears 
to all men in general. Elements dissociated have been med-
dled with by the imagination as surely as elements associated. 
Perception and conduct owe unique character to this same 
double process of association and dissociation, which it is our 
present task to show, holds also for the thinking process 
proper. 
Let us suppose the case of a child who yesterday suffered 
pain as a consequence of putting its finger into the flame of 
a candle. Today it sees another flame-and halts a wayward 
hand just in time, thanks to yesterday's association between 
flame and pain. But we have also to thank a dissociation by 
contiguity in time. Today's situation dissociated from yester-
day's, and this alone enables the child to use yesterday's ex-
perience as a value. Can we generalize from from this and 
say th::it the logic of morals ever seeks differences and that 
formal logic ever seeks resemblances? First appearances 
render the view plausible. Resolving the unknown to the 
known on the basis of resemblance is the avowed task of 
formal reasoning as expressed in science. The moral reason, 
on the other hand, is as stubbornly bent on finding in reality 
a virtue or good which the appearances deny. But the rela-
tion of imagination to formal and moral logic is generic, and 
32 Th. Ribot, Essa.ys on the Creative Imagination, 1906, p. 26. 
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in our usage this implies that however specialized formal and 
moral logic become, they must still make an implicit use of 
what they have sacrificed in order that they may become 
what they are. We accordingly expect to find in both formal 
and moral reasoning a mutual process of generalization and 
particularization. By way of example let us take a simple 
case of formal thinking, where questions of value will seem 
to be entirely excluded. 
48. Imagine, then, a child exercising the elementary power 
in arithmetic which we term counting. Here the principle of 
Aristotle, that things remain what they are, seems to find a 
rigid and exclusive usage. But is there no other principle of 
thought operating? We cannot ask, does the child employ 
the Aristotelian principle explicitly, and another principle 
implicitly, for he succeeds without any theory about the mat-
ter at all. It is we who reduce his operations to principles: 
and we answer the above question by saying, "Yes, there 
enters into this process a principle which goes far beyond 
numbers themselves,. and far beyond the principle of Aris-
totle. We refer to the unconscious assumption of the child 
ihat he can continue to count. The child counts by successive 
acts· of attention, but the number of these acts will always be 
finite. From whence, then, comes his conviction that he can 
count or could count indefinitely? " We have," said Poin-
care, 33 "the faculty of conceiving that a unit can be added 
to a collection of units; thanks to experience, we have occa-
sion to exercise this faculty and we become conscious of it ; 
but from this moment we feel that our power has not limit 
and that we can count indefinitely, though we have never had 
to count more than a finite number of objects." Poincare 
suggests the origin of this infinity of nu:mber: it is due to 
that part of our nature which is able to conceive of the in-
finite repetitions of an act. Counting therefore involves a 
paradox. We count to exhaust the class of things we are 
33 Poincare, Henri, Dernieres Pensees, 1913, p. 21. 
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counting, and yet we conceive that our arithmetic extends to 
infinity. But this is a pararlox only so long as we think that 
the Aristotelian principle is the only one involved in reason-
ing. Experience belies it, for in experience no matter how 
much we count, always something remains over. What this 
' something ' is, is more than arithmetic can tell: that art 
only knows what is has counted already. As Renouvier ob-
served, 34 the number series, 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., does not reach an 
infinite number. Consequently, anything numbered must 
always exist in finite amount. Only the possibility of counting 
is infinite. But is this unending possibility due to a certain 
potency of human nature alone? No, for thought is moulded 
on things, and our minds could not think the possibility of 
counting as being infinite if there were not in nature a certain 
inexhaustible richness which permits it. But those who wish 
to make arithmetic into metaphysics, i.e., those who have the 
Pythagorean notion that the universe is a universe of num-
bers only, must require that the parts of the universe that 
have so far escaped the mathematical inventory of science is 
still given in finite amount. James very justly points out 35 
that all science may legitimately require of the universe is 
that nothing should be lacking. It is not even true to say 
that the counted things are limited: the things we count are 
limited only in the sense that we conventionally accept them 
as such. A tree is 'one' object only when we are counting 
trees; but the moment we change our point of view, we may 
regard the tree as a fraction of a larger unit or as a con-
stellation of innumerable atoms. In truth, it is only our 
counting itself that is ' limited,' not the things counted. 
Every object we count is a unit because we are at the time 
satisfied with it as such. But our imagination, ever restless, 
does not even permit an atom to remain ' one,' strenuously 
as we ma yassume this while we are quantifying nature. 
Every number, in fact, is at once a unity and multiplicity. 
34 William James, Some Problems of Philosophy, 1911, p. 162. 
35 Idem., p. 162. 
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Arithmetic can show us how to count, but not when to cease 
counting. This latter knowledge is given us by our purposes, 
by the goals toward which we strive. Thus, even the child 
of our illustration exercises two faculties in his arithmetic. 
He reasons in terms of the ' imitation ' of similars, but the 
similars he counts, and how many of them is determined by 
his moral sense. Just as a buyer in the market place counts 
the money he intends to pay in .exchange for the goods he 
receives. He not only counts, but counts a specific amount, 
and this amount is a value subject to judgments to which the 
counting itself is not subject. The price of the goods may 
be 'fair' or unjust, but with this the mere number of the 
coins paid has nothing to do. It is indifferent whether we 
say that the goods is paid for with several dollars or several 
hundreds of cents. Here formal and moral thinking co-
operate without quarreling. It is only when we become con-
scious of our mental processes, when we think about thinking,, 
that difficulties arise. To the child, the principle of contra-
diction and the principle of progress operate unawares in 
his thought. It is only when we become aware of the opera-
tion of principles of thought that the difficulties of meta-
physics arise. Is not imagination here seeking to know what 
it can and what it cannot do? This is an issue which has 
momentous ·consequences: the issue as to whether or not 
formal reasoning is adequate to all problems is a crucial issue 
in this age of exact science; and in fact in the history of 
ideas which underlies all history, this issue has been many 
times fought. 
It is not wholly true that in normal imaginative thinking 
formal logic takes care of particularity, and that moral ideas 
provide unity in1 terms of the unity of goals. Generality and 
particularity appear together in both facts and values. The 
unity of number is the unity of some value which gives a 
common character to its members. But is value once and 
always unitary? No, for in moral reasoning they become 
explicitly plural. That is, in moral thinking we do not count 
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similarities of things, but their differences, because each 
difference represents a virtue which we dare not neglect. 
The intellect posits a universe of being, and deals democrat-
ically with all things in terms of quantity and number. But 
moral reason does not ask, " How many books exist and 
what is their total quantity in weight?" It seeks rather tq 
learn the multiform good and evil effects of particular books, 
and holds that this is the matter which should determine 
their number. But to achieve this, counting is still necessary 
-necessary in order to determine the labor it will take to 
destroy the bad and create the good. That is, for action, 
quantity and number are values. 
49. Let us consider further the special case of a class of 
enumerated objects., Their classification rests upon one or 
more traits which they have in common. This principle of 
unity will be a value of some kind, other than quantity. To 
be sure, in mathematics we have classes of numbers: the 
class of rational as contrasted with the irrational numbers, 
or the integers as contrasted with the fractions. Here it will 
seem that we have objects forming a class with no other 
properties whatever except that of quantity. Can quantity 
as such be a principle of the unity of a class? Mathematics 
is drawn from experience and is a powerful instrument in 
guiding it. What is the psychology of its success if it does 
not employ a value of some kind as the basis for its classi-
fications? We think that the mathematician does introduce 
values as the basis of his classification as follows : If his 
units are really enumerated, if he writes, 1/10, 2/10, 3/10, 
etc., here are vital realities, each one representing an act of 
attention and a movement. It is by such finite increments 
that he hopes to arrive at the number one which is more than 
a quantity-it is a goal and therefore a value, at which he 
arrives just as we arrive at home by so many discrete steps. 
Now, the classes of numbers are just such' homes' or beacons, 
or havens of rest, to which the mathematician directs hiB 
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endeavors. These quantities are values because they are the 
milestones of human effort. 
The ' tristram Shandy paradox ' may serve as an illustra-
tion to make clear what we mean. Tristram Shandy took two 
years to write the biography of the first two days of his life. 
Can we conclude that at this rate the biography will ever 
be completed? Bertrand Russell 36 thinks that it can (sup-
posing the author to be immortal). Since the days and years 
have no last term, he argues, any assigned day will be written 
about, a:hd no part of the life remain unwritten. But, as 
James points out, the first price of an infinite attainment is 
that of never becoming weary of an impossible task. Russell 
is right in hypothesis, if we neglect the reality of time and 
fatigue. But even counting takes place in time, and this 
leaves a chasm between Tristram Shandy's life and his auto-
biography which obliges us to say that there will always be 
years of his life which are not written. 
What ~dvantage is gained by erecting quantities into 
artificial goals of endeavor in the science of mathematics? 
There is gained a generality of power. The real spaces in 
which we move and with which we are familiar, under the 
survey of practiced eyes and the motor mechanisms which 
they control, will fall into various cut-and-dried paths of 
movement, each of which forewarns us of the number and 
kinds of tensions which will be required to traverse it. Now, 
the virtue of mat_hematics is that it frees imagination from 
the thraldom to habit. The realm of numbers are a veritable 
field of ' anyness," as Carus called it, in which the energy 
of our acts may be infinitely small and delicate and may 
traverse the strange spaces of hyper-Euclidean geometry. 
Imagination is ever engaged in achieving means of progress 
which a custom-ridden habit declares 'irrational.' 'Number ' 
is the most democratic evaluation that we can give to things. 
When we merely count things, we give each of them an equal 
36 Wm. James, Some Problems of Phi'.losophy, 1911, p. 183. 
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status of reality: this again frees us from that bias of moral 
reason which has credited each thing with a particular virtue. 
But number alone is too democratic: so democratic that 
arithmetic alone does not tell us how far to subd1vide the 
world when we count. If simplicity is the only virtue, then 
why count beyond the five continents and the five seas? But 
here the moral sense intervenes, and would carry things to 
the opposite extreme: forbidding that the stom be indivisible 
and demanding that number be infinite. The ordinary in-
tegers serve nearly all exigencies of our daily life, but the 
mathematicians have been driven to imagine minute fractions 
between them, and between these threads of irrational num-
bers. What does this mean other than that in the moral 
~phere no quantity can be so small that it is not forth count-
ing. So also mathematical space eternally falls spart into 
new points. Is this in obedience to any other demand than 
the restless importunity of a spirit which, like Maxwell's 
demons, would leave no other position of the universe unaf-
fected by its will? In action, we find a compromise, and the 
' objects ' with which we deal represent our compromise be-
tween unity of quantitative being and the infinite uses to 
which we would put it if we could. The number ' one ' with 
which we christen the object, itself wavers between absolute 
unity and infinite divisibility. We must think of the imagina-
tion functioning by a succession of tensions (and we surmise 
that this has its counterpart in the mechanism of the mind's 
control over the body). What is gained in this process? A 
working balance between special efficiency of function and 
generality of adaptation. The intellect posits a universe of 
mere being accountable in terms of quantity and number. 
Here is at once generality and particularity, as much of each 
as we please. Here is generality of power, for when all things 
are reduced to the generality of being, we gain by the sacrifice 
of all form, a maximum of potentiality. Upon this as a 
flexible medium, the imagination can exercise itself, free from 
all conventions of habit and custom. We too often think of 
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the notions of space and matter as poverty-stricken and drab 
images. On the contrary, the points of space and the atoms of 
matter permit a constructive ingenuity to which there is no 
ideal limit. It is here that we build up in fancy that ideal 
good which we hope some day to build in concrete form. 
Thus, the highly differentiated function of formal and moral 
logic reflects the infinite growth of our moral ideals. 
So in moralizing, each good is final and absolute for the 
individual acts which realize it. Ideals are goals for our 
endeavor: this is their general function. Most general of all 
is the good, which as a goal is not concerned with particulars. 
It represents a "purposing which goes on forever." 37 Yet, 
each goal is attained by a series of numbered steps: these 
are the purposes "which come and go." 
50. In our consideration of the imagination up to this 
point we have given a too exclusive consideration to mathe-
matics, at the expense .of formal logic. We take the two as 
the type examples of formal reasoning, and would emphasize 
the point made by Russell that logic is but the youth of 
mathematics. Its attempt to attain maturity is well evi-
denced by Russell's own symbolic logic. . The similarity of 
formal logic to mathematics is a point that will not go undis-
puted, and we will consider it first. Then, we will examine 
anew our general principle that special forms of thinking 
have developed from imagination. If formal logic is the 
product of such a growth, the proof will be in its inability 
to get along without the capacities it has abandoned. That 
is, we shall find in formal logic that fact and value are in-
separable, though value be suppressed for the sttke of the 
syllogism, just as in mathematics it is suppressed for the 
sake of counting. We shall expect to find judgment, like 
number, at once analytic and synthetic. 
As regards the formal status of logic, we would qualify 
Russell's statement by saying that logic is destined to remain 
37 A. W. Moore, Pragmatism and Its Critics, 1910, pp. 156-8. 
141 
100 The Concept of Duration· 
the "youth of mathematics," unless it is to give up a very 
crucial difference which separates them. This point of sepa-
ration appears clearly between a logical and a mathematical 
class. The mathematical class, as we saw, has as its uniting 
prindple the notion of quantity, though value is implicit in it. 
On the other hand, the members of a logical class are ex-
plicitly united by some definite qualities or properties. The 
mathematician escapes a difficulty which particularly harasses 
logic, that is the problem of nominalism. · In mathematics we 
seemingly find it easy to take a number as at once singular 
and plural: but we showed that this is not actually the case. 
Given the digit 'one' for example, it can be a plurality only 
on the condition of its divisibility, but this involves expecta-
tion and savors of value. If we have the fractional parts of 
the number one given, we attain to oneness by a similar pro-
cess of introducing the notion of value, this time the number 
one will be a goal. May it be said that there are other types 
of mathematical classes whose membership is differently con-
stituted than by this part and whole idea? But since all 
numbers are quantities, the only device by means of which 
we can divide them into sub-classes is to take advantage of 
the fact that some have certain qualitative traits which dis-
tinguish them. Finite numbers are thus distinguished from 
transfinite numbers, and the rational from the irrational 
numbers which are beyond all finite limits, greater than all 
finite numbers. We can see that the distinction here depends 
on the introduction of the notion of time-transfinite numbers 
are actually infinite; for them, the possibility of continuing 
to count still further does not exist. Similarly, irrational' 
numbers were invented to solve a certain ' timeful ' difficulty 
that arises in the case of ordinary fractions. Between two 
rational fractions, for example, 1/lOth and 1/llth there is 
a gap, but a gap which can never be filled by inventing other 
rational fractions between them. So, the mathematician con-
ceives that there are other 'irrational' fractions with the 
peculiar power which enables them to bridge these gaps with-
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out the infinite vista of time which is required for rational 
numbers to brdge these gaps. Thus, the distinction between 
finite numbers and transfinite numbers is not a distinction of 
quantity, but a distinction of quality, the difference between 
finite and infinite goals. The same can be said of the dis-
tinction between rational and irrational numbers. 
We make use of similar notions when we distinguish the 
real quantities of space which we number. Consider weight 
and volume as types of quantity. If they were quantities of 
the same kind then we should get the true quantity of a body 
by adding weight to volume. But instead we divide weight 
by volume. Nothing could have taught us to do this except 
that unique balance, the muscular system which measures 
quantity by its intensity, by its resistance to effort. This 
intensity of effort is determined by the lapse of time in which 
it occurs: so that a body of great volume will not have the 
same intensity as a smaller one of the same weight, since 
the space it covers requires us to apply effort at more points 
or else to distribute them more in time. Far from dealing 
with pure quantity as such, we are here already in the midst 
of a drama, replete with values and choices. 
51. The entities which ordinary logic classifies have other 
properties besides their sheer substance. One or more of 
these characteristics may serve as the basis for a classifica-
tion, but each one of them nevertheless retains the character-
istics of substance not considered in making the classification. 
Hence arises the problem of realism versus nominalism. Is 
the class real, or is it only a name? How does it grasp the 
realism of its members without destroying them? How can 
a universe which means no particular thing, mean anything 
at all? The debate, realism versus nominalism, arises be-
cause we create an antithesis between knowledge and things. 
We take knowledge to be the unchanging, that is, the general 
or the universal properties of things. The particular we seg-
regate in the material world. Matter and knowledge thus ap-
pear utterly different, and we decide for the reality of the 
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one or the other according to our temperament and training. 
We believe either in the reality of general ideas or in the 
reality of particulars. Our view is that the truth is some-
where between these extremes. We do not think that the 
world of things monopolizes particularity, nor that concepts 
monopolize generality. We think that there is ageneral first-
truth about the universe which the first glow of thought must 
have discerned: namely, that existence is indeterminate. 
Ours is at once a world of being and becoming: a world 
which is, and yet a world which may be augumented or which 
may perish. It is the function of the imagination to portray 
so certain and yet so uncertan a universe. It has specialized 
its task, evolving the intellect to take account of the world 
that is, and the moral reason for dealing with the problem of 
transforming it. But these two manners of reasoning must 
not lose sight of each other, and we think that the notions of 
generality and of individuality in logic, rightly understood, 
will throw much light on their cooperation. 
There is a certain generality and particularity about things 
already, and the same can be said of concepts. Things have 
in common the property of reality. Their indubitable claim 
to this is their power to affect us. This it is which has led 
philosophers to ascribe to them substances, and this is the 
meaning of matter in science. But they affect us in par-
ticular ways and at different loci in space. This constitutes 
their particularity. So far, we have described an object as 
a fact, as a datum of experience; and we find that its factual 
status is at once general and particular. Between this 
generality of substance and the particular properties which 
it yields, there is a genetic relation. The matter, the sub1 
stance, is the source of of unique properties which we may; 
find in it in the future. Thus the visual impression which we 
call 'gray ' may in time divide into two properties, yellow 
and blue, and yellow in time yields red and green. What is 
the value status of an object? Its present phenomenal prop-
erties are specific values now. But it has also a general 
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value, constituted by its ' substance ' which may in time give 
rise to new phenomena. But the instant we take the point 
of view of an evolved future, the substance of a thing is the 
F-pecific thing about it, while its accidents or 'phenomenal 
properties ' seem to exhibit potentiality. This latter point of 
view is that of rationalism, while empiricism looks at phen-
omena from the point of view of the present. The difference 
between the two philosophies resolved to a difference of point 
of view, and it is a difference which is determined by the con-
cept of time. The rationalist considers nature as if all time 
had already flown, and to him substance will seem to preempt 
the realm of being and ' accidents ' or appearances the realm 
of becoming. From the point of view of the present, however, 
it is the appearances which are real, and substance which is 
the source of becoming. The truth is somewhere between 
these views. We shall find these views reconciled in im-
aginative thought, which takes account of the two points of 
view at once. Imagination, like conduct, moves in a medium 
of time in which past, present, and future maintain an 
organic unity. It reasons in terms of both fact and value, 
and carries on the work of generalization and particulariza-
tion at the same time. In it, the principle of similarity anq 
the principle of causality are in harmonious cooperation, just 
as they are in the realm of deeds, where we note resemblances 
even while we prepare to destroy them. 
4 
EMBODIMENT OF TIME IN THE IMAGINATIVE LIFE 
52. William Jams somewhere observes that the philosopher 
is one who is astonished at the commonplace. In truth, it is 
the commonplace which is enveloped in the greatest mystery. 
The pull o fgravity which we never escape is the eternal 
puzzle of physics; while that very mainstay of life which we 
call matter is still a stranger to chemistry. We seem to find 
anchorage on a stable foundation of matter, yet it is against 
this very influence that we constantly struggle. Most baf-
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fling of all is the mystery of knowledge which represents 
itself as knowing nothing of this struggle, but which is never-
theless able to guide us aright when we engage in it. 
Immediate experience too is engaged in a perpetual prob-
lem, but its problem is not a purely formal one. In it we ex-
ercise a double form of comprehension: we think at once in 
terms of forms and of ideals, and this constitutes imaginative 
thought. Imagination is immediate experience became artic-
ulate, and so near experience is it, that the borders of the 
two constantly overlap. Imagination brings us nearest to 
that contact between spirit and matter which is of prime 
concern at once of the active and the reflective life. Im-
mediate experience leads us to see that our world is com-
pounded of two ingredients, seemingly aline to each other 
but both familiar to us. These ingredients we have called 
fact and value. All that we call the sweat and toil of life, its 
fortunes and its mischances, constitute the conditions upon 
which we may mediate between the world of fact and the 
world of value. Time and labor are the prices which we pay 
for this transformation. 
But formal concepts and motives play each an indispensable 
v.art in this process. Our motives discern goals, but formal 
concepts designate for us the means of their attainment. It 
is the business of conceptual thought to place at our disposal 
a mass of knowledge gleaned from the past, and this knowl-
edge is timeless to the degree that it frees us from the fortuity 
of time. Formal concepts present to us that which we may 
most inevitably expect from nature. It is the function of 
formal reason to keep informed about the world of being. 
Moore 38 well compares the canons of reasoning to intellectual 
habits, slowly developed because of our contacts with a rela-
tively static material world. The postulate of the uniformity 
of nature is but an inveterate expectation with which we 
approach the world. One selects his own hat from a number 
38 A. W. Moore, Pragmatism and Its Critics, 1910. This matter is 
discussed in detail in Chapter XL 
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of them. Here the law, "All things remain what they are," 
is wholly tacit. The Aristotelian principle is but this same 
habit becomes articulate. Habit is notorious for its inability 
to achieve a new act which is not already in its repertoire. 
Where there is a unique problem, habit can only tell us the 
way in which we cannot solve it. Suppose we reach for an 
object only to find that it is an image reflected in a mirror. 
In this case the habit of reaching only leaves us with the 
realization that we have failed. So also the syllogisms of 
formal logic tell us only when we reason wrongly. We make 
use of an inveterate mental habit for going from one premise 
to another, just as we reach for an object always with the 
same rectilinear movement. 
But this habit of reaching cannot assure us that the object 
for which we reach is indubitably real, and that it is not a 
virtual image; and neither does the syllagism tell us whether 
the judgments it employs are true. Of course, we commonly 
deal only with real objects and ordinarily make inferences 
only from true judgments; but here is just the difficulty: 
this is true only commonly. Uniformity is but part of nature; 
and therefore there are aspects of experience with which 
habits and syllogisms cannot cope. As Poincare declared, 
"To wish to comprise nature in science would be to want to 
put the whole into the part." 39 The very realism of life de-
pend son this unstable and unshifting aspect of the universe. 
If the world were indeed guaranteed an uncorrupted and 
eternal existence then habit would be adequate to all problems 
of action. But if a habit is a mechanical mode of adjust-
ment, as it is currently defined, then 'adaptation' would 
appear to go on without consciousness. Of course, in this 
case, 'adaptation' would cease to have any meaning. In 
such a world all logical problems (if we grant that they 
could even arise) might be solved by those logical machines 
which savants have invented for their amusement. But habits 
are never entirely mechanical as is proved by the fact that 
39 Henri Poincare, The Value of Science, 1907, p. 4. 
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they are subject to the process of learning. Habits too deal 
with a world of becoming. The intellectualist has sought to 
make immediate experience articulate, and he has supposed 
that to achieve this finalism is required. But his mechanical 
syllogisms are not thought for the same reason that a me-
chanical habit is not conduct. Mechanical action and me-
chanical thought are by definition effortless and unconscious, 
and by these tokens timeless. Real thought and real conduct 
are quite different: they are laborious and dramatic in 
character. Habits and the figures of the syllogism are useless 
unless we are able to apply the right habit or the right 
syllogism at the right time. Habit and thought are under a 
similar want, the want of converting a real into an ideal 
world. We cannot say that they are under a necessity of 
reconciling fact and value, unless we understand this neces~ 
sity in a unique sense. It must be not a logical necessity but 
a felt necessity, a necessity which attracts us. That is, our 
free choice to pursue truth is prior to the ' logical necessity ' 
of getting truth according to the rules. Allegiance to the 
pursuit of truth, the spirit of science, like- every true allegi-
ance is of the volunteed variety: our allegiance to ideals is 
a bond which we ourselves establish. But there is another 
bond which is ' necessary ' in an ontological sense: this 
necessity, forced upon us after we have forced values upon 
ourselves, requires us to pay for every value attained and by 
a price of labor and waiting. All consciousness of time is 
conditioned by this factor: the sense of time exists only 
where there are goals upon which our hopes and efforts can 
converge. And the realism of time and of labor inhere in 
the fact that our labor and our waiting may be in vain. 
These matters are commonplace to immediate experience and 
to imagination. The expenditures of effort and the risks of 
chance are brute necessities which conduct and thought never 
escape, provided they have already accepted the challenge of 
ideals. This all comes to saying that if we choose to live, we 
can live only under this minimum condition, namely: that 
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we accept a certain discontent with the conditions of life. 
The infinitely diverse deeds and thoughts of a lifetime have 
yet one quest in common, to discover that which is the most 
constant and also to discover how the constant may be trans-
formed. Even the turnip must have a slumbering discontent 
with its state; only this saves it from being mere clay. To 
be sure, the choice of life itself is reversible, but the suicide 
chooses also to sever his allegiance to ideal causes which his 
life might further. What is unescapable and onotologically 
necessary is the labor and chance of living, once we have 
accepted life as worth while. 
53. But imagination has a unique way of dealing with this 
necessity. Like a good general, it accepts the conditions of 
combat; that is, it begins by conceiving the real and the ideal 
world in their fullest opposition. Formal and moral reasoning 
constitute acts of acceptance of the duality of the world in 
which we live. But in this sharp separation of the world 
which is real from the world which is ideal, time and labor, 
whch just now united these worlds in action, seem to vanish. 
Perfect ideality is only infinitely possible, and the infinite 
cannot be attained by steps which occupy finite moments of 
time. The finite and the infinite become different in kind; 
and we cannot mount to the infinite by multiplying the finite. 
Time and effort seem incapable of mediating these worlds. 
It is just this initial act of the imagination which we be-
lieve has been misunderstood, and it is this which has given 
rise to most of the puzzles of epistemology. This opposition 
of the conserved material reality to pure possibility may be 
interpreted in two ways. Either it is an acceptance of the 
challenge of life in the severest form in which it can be con-
ceived, or else they constitute judgments on the nature of 
reality. In the first case, the opposition of pure fact to pure 
value is but the first movement of thought. But we are 
tempted to take this first movement of thought for its last. 
Reason begins by positing the universe as given once for all, 
but it has already made preparation for changing the universe 
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in this very assumption; for it insists that the givenness is 
in infinitely small particles, and it is this which enables the 
'given' universe to be so plastic. The world is given 'once 
for all' says the intellect, but it says this with the proviso 
that the size of its particles and the positions which they may 
occupy are not given once for all. Hence, that perfectly 
rigidity and perfect -plasticity of the world with which science 
deals. The concepts of the exact sciences are crowde dwith 
dramatic elements in spite of their explicit avowal of their 
timelessness. This is evident in the classic paradox of 
science, the calculus of probabilities. The phrase is itself a 
paradox, for a true calculus should admit of no probabilities: 
it should only give certainties. 
The events of experience will not yield a perfect calculus 
no matter how carefully we observe their frequencies. That 
is, real events never quite ' fit' the curve of mathematical 
chance which alone represent a perfect calculus. The chance 
occurrences of our experiences only approximate uniformity 
of frequencies. If we toss coins, the requirement of a perfect 
calculus would be that the chance of ' head ' or ' tail ' be equal. 
But we only approximate this equality in experience. Even 
if we are fortunate enough to find one hundred tosses result-
ing equally divided between the two possibilities, we are beset 
with the doubt lest even this may be an accident, which more 
tosses may confirm or deny. Suppose we forsake experience 
and try to attain a perfect calculus in theory. But we still 
find that the difficulty pursues us, for we will be confronted 
by a barrier in our own logic. The difficulty with experience 
was, that it did not tell us where and when the particular 
events would occur which we are seeking to reduce to a cal-
culus. And to renounce experience is but to transfer this 
same difficulty to the rational plane: for the law of chance 
fails to tell us just where the particulars will occur that sub-
stantiate the law. Certainly a probability of one-half does 
not free us from the fortuity of time. It should only do so 
perfectly when, for example, tossing the coin we should find 
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that it yielded half heads and half tails each throw, which is 
an absurdity. Even if we possessed a coin which never 
failed to turn up heads and tails in perfect alternation, it 
would violate the law of chance one-half of the time. In this 
case, the notion of a perfect calculus is satisfied only when 
we know we are going to toss the coin again, but this is a 
matter which the calculus itself cannot fortell. In short, the 
one thing which always resists the power of the calculus is a 
certain fortuity of time which is expressed not only in nature 
at large, but especially in the activities of the human will. 
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